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Signatures are primarily used as a mark of authenticity, to demonstrate that the sender of a message is who
they claim to be. In the current digital age, signatures underpin trust in the vast majority of information
that we exchange, particularly on public networks such as the internet. However, schemes for signing digital
information which are based on assumptions of computational complexity are facing challenges from advances
in mathematics, the capability of computers, and the advent of the quantum era. Here we present a review of
digital signature schemes, looking at their origins and where they are under threat. Next, we introduce post-
quantum digital schemes, which are being developed with the specific intent of mitigating against threats from
quantum algorithms whilst still relying on digital processes and infrastructure. Finally, we review schemes for
signing information carried on quantum channels, which promise provable security metrics. Signatures were
invented as a practical means of authenticating communications and it is important that the practicality of
novel signature schemes is considered carefully, which is kept as a common theme of interest throughout this
review.
CONTENTS
I. Introduction 1
II. Classical Signatures 2
A. Digital Signatures and Security Formalised 2
B. Asymmetric Cryptography and Digital
Signatures 3
1. Modular Exponentiation and the RSA
Cryptosystem 3
2. A note on symmetric digital signatures 5
C. Other Bases of Schemes 5
1. Modular Squaring 5
2. The Discrete Logarithm Problem 6
D. Security and Attacks across Asymmetric
Signing 6
1. Signature Scheme Resistant to Adaptive
Chosen Message Attacks 6
2. Hashing 6
3. Probabilistic Signatures 7
E. Cryptographic Standards and Modern Use 7
F. Looking forward for security 8
III. Post-Quantum Digital Signatures 8
A. Introduction: A Problem 8
1. Quantum Cryptanalysis of Classical
Cryptography 8
2. What’s being done? 9
B. Multivariate Cryptography 9
1. Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar 10
2. Hidden Field Equations 11
3. 5-Pass SSH 11
4. Attacks 11
C. Lattice Cryptography 12
1. Fundamental Hard Problems 12
2. Foundations of Contemporary Lattice
Crypto 13
3. The GPV Framework 13
4. Bai-Galbraith Signatures 14
5. Attacks 15
D. Symmetric Primitive Based Submissions 16
1. Picnic 16
2. SPHINCS+ 16
3. Attacks 17
E. Side-Channel Attacks 17
F. Performance 18
G. Concluding Remarks on Post-Quantum
Digital-Signatures 18
IV. Quantum Digital Signatures 19
A. Key Concepts General to QDS 19
1. Quantifying Authentication 20
B. QDS with Quantum Memory 21
C. Multiport set-up 22
D. Random Forwarding 24
E. QKD Key Generation Protocol 25
F. Expanding to Signing Multiple Bits 26
1. Conflict over Protocol Iteration 26
2. “End Tagging” 27
G. Further Extensions 27
1. Insecure Channels 27
2. Measurement Device Independent 28
3. Expanding to Multiple Parties 29
H. Concluding Remarks on QDS 29
V. Conclusion 30
References 30
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical signatures are marks made to identify or
authenticate the creator of a message or artifact. Their
precise origins are lost to history, but they are associated
with some of the earliest records of pictographic scripts,
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dating back at least 5 millennia1. The information and
telecommunications revolution in the second half of
the 20th century would not have happened without a
practical means to authenticate messages, which led to
the invention of digital signature schemes.
Schemes for signing digital information are a di-
rect, albeit stronger, analogue to physical signatures;
they seek to ensure (i) authenticity of any claim regard-
ing a message sender’s identity, (ii) that the message has
not been altered by any parties since the signing, and
(iii) that the sender cannot refute that it was indeed
them who signed the message. In chapter 2 we review
the origins of digital signatures, their applications and
vulnerabilities associated with assumptions made in
their foundation.
Post-quantum cryptography focuses on building classical
algorithms whose security is resistant to known capa-
bilities of quantum algorithms. Post-quantum signature
schemes build upon early work in digital signatures. In
chapter 3 we review progress made in this field and look
closely at the resources required to implement these
emerging algorithms.
It has been shown that algorithms using informa-
tion encodes on quantum states can be used for secure
communication protocols that are not dependent upon
unproven assumptions, but instead are provably secure
within the laws of physics itself. Chapter 4 discusses the
application of quantum information and communications
to signature schemes.
II. CLASSICAL SIGNATURES
The pursuit of secure digital signature schemes was of
great importance in 20th-century cryptographic research.
Digital signatures are considered to be a cryptographic
primitive with widespread application and use, with le-
gal precedence in some jurisdictions. Like their physical
counterparts, digital signatures are indeed used to au-
thenticate the sending of a message, but their strength as
a primitive protocol does not end here. Since their intro-
duction in 1976 by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman,2
further applications have been found in the building of
secure distribution schemes, digitally processed financial
transactions, cryptocurrencies3 and more. It is known
that a primitive analogue to digital signatures was de-
veloped decades before Diffie and Hellman made their
public contributions, with the earliest known notion of
authentication by some form of digital signature being a
challenge-response mechanism used by the US Air Force
to identify friendly aircraft, as far back as 19524. Re-
markably, even national identity and national govern-
ment systems can be built with digital signatures at their
core, as witnessed in Estonia’s use of blockchain-style se-
curity for their Identity Card system, and eResidency
scheme offered to International visitors and investors5.
A. Digital Signatures and Security Formalised
In the following section we define digital signature
schemes and their relevant security notions, as well as
providing formal schematics of simple implementations
of such schemes from the literature.
Definition 1 (Digital Signature Scheme). A digital signa-
ture scheme is a cryptographic protocol consisting of two
distinct algorithms:
• A signing algorithm, in which the signing party (Al-
ice), given a message (and typically a private key),
produces a signature
• A verification algorithm, in which, given the mes-
sage and signature, the verifier (Bob) either accepts
or rejects Alice’s claim of authenticity of the mes-
sage
Digital signatures can fall into one of two categories,
based on parties involved:
• True signatures: Requiring only two parties, Alice
(the signer) and Bob (the receiver), true signature
schemes involve the transmission of information di-
rectly from Alice to Bob, typically in the form of a
message-signature pair and most often using asym-
metric key cryptosystems (public key cryptogra-
phy)
• Arbitrated signatures Requiring a trusted third
party, Charlie (the arbiter), this type of scheme in-
volves two distinct rounds of communications: Al-
ice’s communication to Charlie, and Charlie’s com-
munication to Bob. In this setup, Charlie provides
verification to Bob, and the landscape is opened up
for the use of symmetric key cryptosystems (private
key cryptography).
Digital signature schemes are typically preceded by some
form of key generation (and distribution if necessary),
allowing us to express all signature schemes in terms of
the following three steps:
• GEN: A key generation algorithm producing a pri-
vate key (or set of private keys) and, if necessary,
public keys.
• SIGN: Signature generated with a signing algo-
rithm, and sent to Bob.
• VER: Bob receives the signature, and follows a ver-
ification algorithm before deciding whether or not
to trust Alice’s claim.
For any signature scheme to be considered secure and
trustworthy for use, we require the scheme to provide
the following under any and all conditions:
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1. Authenticity: The receiver, Bob, when accepting a
signature from Alice is convinced that the author
of the message was indeed Alice.
2. Integrity: The receiver, Bob, can have faith that
the message has not been altered since it left Alice.
3. Non-repudiation: Once a genuine signed message
has left Alice, she has no way to convince Bob that
she was in-fact not the author.
One more property often sought in signature schemes,
but not strictly required for security, is for the signature
to be able to be transferred. A signature scheme satis-
fying the above three conditions will convince Bob that
Alice is indeed the author of the message, but transfer-
ability provides the ability for Bob to convince a third
party, Charlie, that the message is indeed from Alice,
without compromising the security of the system.
Attacks on signature schemes are known to typically fall
into one of the four following categories:
1. Key-only attack: An adversary, Eve, knows only
the public key of Alice (the signer)
2. Known-signature attack: Eve has access to Alice’s
public key, and message-signature pairs produced
by Alice.
3. Chosen-message attack: Eve may choose a list of
messages (m1,m2, ...,ml), which she will ask Alice
to sign.
4. Adaptively-chosen-message attack: Similar to the
above, except Eve has knowledge to adaptively
choose messages based on the resulting message-
signature pair of the previously signed message, al-
lowing her to perform cryptanalysis with greater
precision.
And we may describe the level of success achieved by
Eve, from greatest success to least success, as follows:
1. Secret key knowledge: Eve discovers all of the se-
cret information (typically Alice’s secret key).
2. Universal forgery: Eve is able to forge the signature
of any message, but lacks the secret key itself.
3. Selective forgeries: Eve can forge the signature for
some messages of her choosing, but cannot do this
arbitrarily.
4. Existential forgery: Eve may forge the signature for
at least one message, but lacks the ability to choose
this message from the set of all possible messages.
5. Failure: Eve finds out nothing about the secret in-
formation, and fails to forge a convincing signature
for any message.
Clearly, Eve achieving universal forgery or above would
render the signature scheme completely invalid, as she
could go on to convince Bob (and other parties) that
Alice has signed any message (or, at least fail to be
rejected with utmost confidence). When discussing full
security for a signature scheme, it is typical to demand
it not allow any form of success, i.e., not even existen-
tial forgery, under any computing assumptions (or none).
That existential forgery is considered not permissible
may seem a somewhat “strong” requirement; we could
easily suppose that, given Eve’s inability to choose a
message, we could simply require a very large message
space and propose that a message containing “gibberish”
would not be accepted by Bob. In the case of sending
email communications, this may, at first, seem suitable.
It seems reasonable for Bob to expect Alice’s message
to make sense in their chosen language, and given Eve
has no control over the message contents, we might ex-
pect her to have difficulty randomly selecting a perfectly
coherent message. However, given a scenario in which
Alice is simply sending a number, related to an amount
in currency she is requesting Bob send her, an existential
forgery would carry great threat! Eve might not be able
to choose a precise amount, but it would be hard for Bob
to label a string of integers as nonsensical.
B. Asymmetric Cryptography and Digital Signatures
With research in digital signatures growing alongside
research in public key cryptography4, the majority of
well-known and well-studied signature schemes arise from
public key cryptosystems. These typically rely upon cer-
tain mathematical assumptions about the hardness of
problems (signature schemes based on symmetric encryp-
tion are generally reserved for arbitrated set-ups). An
often-seen method of building a signature scheme is as
follows: Find some public key cryptosystem based on
one-way functions or trap-door functions, generate a sig-
nature using Alice’s private key in the system, and allow
any party to verify that Alice indeed sent the message us-
ing the publicly-shared encryption key. Well-known cryp-
tosystems used in such a way include RSA6, ElGamal7,
Rabin8, and Fiat-Shamir9. We remark that (in a sim-
plified manner), the main property that distinguishes a
one-way function from a trap-door function is the exis-
tence of trap-door knowledge, some secret that allows
the (usually) hard to invert function to become easily
invertible.
1. Modular Exponentiation and the RSA Cryptosystem
A variety of trapdoor functions can be built based on
performing exponentiation modulo n, depending on how
we choose n. The simple act of squaring modulo n where
n = pq for some prime p,q forms a trap-door function,
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in which the trap-door knowledge is the prime factors (p
and q). We can build further trap-door functions with
different exponents by carefully choosing the exponent.
Again, working in modulo n such that n = pq for large
primes p,q, if we choose some e such that e is coprime
with φ(n) = (p− 1)(q− 1) (the Euler totient function of
n) we find that for any given x,
c = xe (mod n)
is a trapdoor function, where the trapdoor is once again
the prime factors p,q. This forms the basis of the RSA
cryptosystem. Whilst the work of Diffie and Hellman
in 1976 may have built the theoretical bench on which
research could seek to implement digital signatures, it
was a later paper by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman that
first exemplified a proof-of-concept on top of this work-
bench. The well-celebrated RSA paper6 published in
1978 marked an early showcasing of asymmetric cryp-
tosystems, well establishing the idea of public-key cryp-
tography in a format that is in widespread use today.
Relying on exponentiation under some n = pq for large
primes p and q, the RSA cryptosystem can be used
to send encrypted data securely (under assumptions),
and the same methodology can be used to implement
a signing algorithm securely. For the basis of an RSA-
Implemented cryptosystem, private keys and public keys
must be created for use in the trap-door function, all of
which is formalised as follows:
• Trap-door function: In the case of RSA, we take
the trap-door function on some bit-string m to be
RSA{E,D}(m) = m
e,d (mod n)
Call RSAE the RSA encryption function using key
e, and RSAD the RSA decryption function using
key d, defined below. We require that n = pq for
some large primes p and q, and choose e such
that for φ(n) = φ(pq) = (p − 1)(q − 1), we have
gcd(e,φ(n)) = 1, where gcd means greatest common
divisor and 1 < e < φ(n).
• Public Key: RSA takes as its encryption key the
above chosen value, e. e is part of the public infor-
mation in the cryptosystem, along with our chosen
n for modular arithmetic.
• Decryption key: One calculates the decryption key,
d, by determining the multiplicative inverse of e
mod φ(n), i.e., determining d ≡ e−1(mod φ(n)).
The decryption exponent, along with the prime fac-
tors p,q, of n, are kept secret. d can be easily cal-
culated when p and q are known.
We denote a message as m, with C being the resulting
ciphertext following encryption on m, and S a signature
(generated from a message m). The leading motivation
for the RSA cryptosystem is its use for easy encryption
of a message. Anyone with knowledge of the publicly
shared information (e and n) can easily encrypt a
message m by performing C = me mod n. The intended
recipient of the secret message, Alice, can easily recover
m = Cd mod n, and anyone lacking knowledge of d who
intercepts C will struggle to find m from just the public
knowledge. Loosely, the “hardness” of recovering m
without d relies upon the hardness of discovering d
without knowledge of p and q. We then see that, really,
the security of the RSA cryptosystem reduces down to
the intractability of factoring n into its prime factors
p,q. This form of problem reduction is seen throughout
digital signatures, and indeed all of cryptography.
Whilst the above demonstrates RSA’s use as a tool to
allow any party to transmit secret messages to a recipient
Alice, it is easy to use the same tools to allow Alice to
sign a message that can be verified by any party. Suppose
Alice seeks to send a message, m, to some party Bob
who wishes to verify that this message was not sent by
some third party. This can be achieved by both parties
carrying out the following:
1. Utilising her secret decryption key, Alice can now
compute RSAD(m) = m
d mod n = Sm.
2. Alice sends the message m to Bob, along with the
associated signature, Sm.
3. Bob simply calculates RSAe(Sx) = S
e
x mod n =
(md)e mod n = md·e mod n = m
From this, it is clear Bob can be convinced that only
Alice (or someone with Alice’s secret decryption key d)
could have sent this message. As e and n are public
knowledge, any other party may also be convinced of
this, allowing transferability of the signature.
This (simplified) view of RSA demonstrates many fun-
damentals of digital signatures within a classical frame-
work: The need for a cryptosystem whose security we
have good reason to believe in, even if it is not provable
(the assumption of intractability presents issues for prov-
able security, see II F), the ability to use this cryptosys-
tem for signing (or at least modifying the cryptosystem
for signing) and the need to ensure the three pillars of se-
curity for digital signatures: authenticity, integrity, and
non-repudiation, whilst also hoping for the (at times less
essential) property of transferability.
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Alice
m
RSAD
d
C
Bob
m
RSAE
e
Figure 1: Schematic demonstrating communications se-
cured using the RSA protocol. Bob encrypts (E) a (pri-
vate) message m, using the RSAE encryption function and
the public key, e. The encrypted message, C, can now
be sent publicly to Alice, who uses the RSAD decryption
function and the private key d, to retrieve m. Circles rep-
resent information that can be presented publicly, whilst
diamonds must remain private.
Alice
m
RSAD
d
Bob
m
m′
RSAE
e
S
Figure 2: Schematic demonstrating message (m) signing
using the RSA protocol. Alice computes a signature S us-
ing the RSAD decryption function, her private key d and
a (public) message m. Both m and S can now be sent to
Bob via a public channel. Bob can now compute m′ to be
stored privately, using the RSAE encryption function, the
retrieved signature S and the public key e. If m′ matches
m closely (according to some pre-determined error-rate),
the signature is accepted as valid. Otherwise, Alice is
not accepted as the author of m. Circles represent infor-
mation that can be presented publicly, whilst diamonds
must remain private. Note the public and private vari-
ants of the message on Bob’s end of communications.
The private m′ is calculated from the signature, and its
value is checked against the publicly sent m.
2. A note on symmetric digital signatures
Whilst much of this section, along with the literature,
focuses on asymmetric signature schemes whose roots lie
in public key cryptosystems, this does not mean sym-
metric signature schemes arising from private key cryp-
tosystems have no value in both research and application.
Given the context (Alice signing a message, Bob veri-
fying) it is easy to see why a private-key cryptosystem
utilising the same (symmetric) key for both encryption
and decryption is considered a weak arrangement for dig-
ital signatures: That both Alice and Bob use the same
encryption key means either party can imitate the other.
As long as Bob knows the encryption transformation used
by Alice, he can always use the private key to generate
a signature to deceive an unwitting third party, Char-
lie. The sought-after property of transferability is clearly
lost. The potential applications for (secure) symmetric
signatures is much smaller than that of asymmetric sig-
natures. Both parties must trust each other to not be
deceitful, which is far from practical for most settings
(especially given the parties may have no knowledge of
each other prior to the signing and verification). How-
ever, such systems are in use: for financial institutions
they can be very beneficial as they are (often) less com-
putationally taxing than their public key counterparts,
and given a scenario where neither party has any reason
to doubt the other’s intentions (such as an ATM commu-
nicating with its parent financial institution), they can be
used to great effect.
C. Other Bases of Schemes
1. Modular Squaring
The function x→ x2 mod n for some x ∈ Z and n = pq,
given p,q are prime, forms a trap-door function in which
the trap-door information, like in RSA, is knowledge of
the prime factors p,q of n. Rabin8 introduced a cryp-
tosystem whose core is reliant on utilising squaring un-
der modular arithmetic as a trap-door function. Use of
Rabin’s system, along with some hashing function, can
produce a signature scheme with certain advantages over
RSA. It is unknown whether or not breaking RSA is ac-
tually as difficult as factoring: the security reduction that
reduces RSA to factoring remains unproven as the RSA
assumption. The potential that there may exist a secu-
rity reduction from RSA to an easier problem than factor-
ing is of concern. However, Rabin proved that breaking
his cryptosystem is as difficult as the factoring problem.
Thus, unlike RSA, cryptographers can find strength in
its security as long as factoring remains intractible.
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2. The Discrete Logarithm Problem
Throughout this section, we have treated the RSA
cryptosystem as a tool by which to lay out the general
case for, and elucidate on general points within, digi-
tal signature schemes. Principally, we have opted for
this approach as the RSA cryptosystem is a well-studied
example of a cryptosystem built upon the notion of a
trapdoor function. As we have previously covered, this
constitutes a popular method of construction, allowing
us to perform both encryption and signing. Yet not all
public-key cryptosystems, or all cryptosystems used to
deploy signature schemes, must be reliant upon trapdoor
functions. The discrete logarithm problem is one such
example of a one-way function with no trapdoor infor-
mation that is successfully implemented in widely-used
signature schemes. Working within finite fields, and let-
ting p be a prime and g some primitive root in Z∗p, the
function
dExp : Zp−1 → Z
∗
p,x 7→ g
x
is a one-way function with no trap-door knowledge. dExp
(the discrete exponential function) is easy to compute
under a finite field, but its inverse, dLog, is believed to
be intractable (the discrete analogue of the logarithmic
function is hard to compute, i.e., it is hard to find x from
dExp(x)= gx) and there exists no “trap-door” information
that makes this inverse easily computable. The assump-
tion about the intractability of computing x is known
as the discrete logarithm assumption, and can form the
basis of a cryptosystem, most notably one devised by
ElGamal7, and has applications in signing of informa-
tion.
D. Security and Attacks across Asymmetric Signing
1. Signature Scheme Resistant to Adaptive Chosen Message
Attacks
Adaptively chosen-message attacks, as defined in IIA,
utilise cryptanalysis of message-signature pairs (signed
by Alice) as a powerful tool in a malicious party’s (Eve’s)
pursuit of existential forgery against a given digital sig-
nature scheme. It is known that many well-studied cryp-
tosystems are susceptible to such an attack, including
RSA. In 1988 Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest (hence-
forth GMR) gave a thorough treatment of their signa-
ture scheme10, whilst proving its security against adap-
tive chosen message attacks. Like many of the schemes
preceding them, GMR’s is reliant on trapdoors. How-
ever, GMR introduced the notion of claw-free permuta-
tion pairs11, and claimed that signature schemes utilising
trap-doors and claw-free permutations could produce an
additional degree of security against adaptively chosen-
message attacks when compared to the then-traditional
method of ‘simple’ trap-door schemes. Whilst the scheme
itself isn’t as simple and easily presentable as RSA, the
basic notion behind the claw-free permutations is simple
to see:
Definition 2. Given a set of numbers, (x,y,z), we call them
a claw of two permutations f0 and f1 if
f0(x) = f1(y) = z.
Further, we define a pair of permutations f0, f1 to be
claw-free if there exists no efficient algorithm for com-
puting a claw given two permutations.
GMR proved that the existence of such permuta-
tions implies the existence of a signature scheme ε-
secure against adaptively-chosen-message attacks, i.e.,
Eve achieves existential forgery with probability < ε.
Additionally, they presented a method of construction
for practical claw-free permutations, utilising mathemat-
ical theory relevant to quadratic residues (an exten-
sively studied tool in number theory, cryptosystems and
cryptanalysis12) in order to find piecewise functions
f0(x) = g0(x)x
2 (mod n)
and
f1(x) = g1(x)x
2 (mod n)
where g0,g1 are piecewise constant functions. There
exist functions in the form of f0, f1 that form claw-
free permutations13. GMR show, via contradiction,
that Eve’s attempts of cryptanlaysis to achieve existen-
tial forgery can be reduced to finding a claw for the
pair of permutations, and thus fail, even if the trap-
door functions used independently remain vulnerable to
adaptively-chosen-message attacks.14
2. Hashing
Typically when performing RSA with the RSA-
encryption and decryption functions RSA{E,D}(m)=m
{d,e}
mod n with message m, encryption and decryption expo-
nents e,d respectively, and modulus n, we take n to be
some 1024-bit number. We bear in mind that, if sending
a message in some text-based language, we are left with
(at most) 128 ASCII characters. Assuming the language
chosen is well-defined with a set of rules, we can assume
most documents that need signing will be greater than
this stringent limit. In order to allow the signing of mes-
sages and documents of arbitrary length, cryptographers
typically turn to hash functions.
Definition 3 (Hash). Simply, a Hash function, H, is a
function taking in as its input some data of arbitrary
length, and outputting a hash digest (or, simply, hash or
digest) of a fixed length.
For use in cryptography, we generally seek the follow-
ing three properties from a hash function:
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• Pre-image resistance: Given a hash digest h, finding
any message m with h = H(m) should be a difficult
task. (We can consider the similarity between this
property, and that of the one-way function.)
• Collision resistance: The essence behind collision
resistance is that there should be a very low proba-
bility of finding two messages outputting the same
digest. Collision resistance is typically categorised
into one of two groups: Weak collision resistance,
in which for given a message m1, it should be diffi-
cult to find a message m2 with H(m1) =H(m2) when
m1 6= m2; and Strong collision resistance, in which
it should be difficult to find two messages m1 6= m2
such that H(m1) = H(m2).
Generally, it is favourable that these properties define
a platform upon which a malicious adversary cannot
modify the input data without changing the digest.
Further, we desire a good distribution of digests, that
is, given two n-bit-strings m1 and m2 with a small
Hamming distance ε, we seek very different outputs, i.e.
a (relatively higher) Hamming distance between H(m1)
and H(m2). Clearly, the overarching goal of creating
a good hash function is that an adversary should find
it very hard to determine the input of a hash, and
cryptanalysis by attacks involving similar messages
should be unable to find a weakness here.
Full security in the random oracle model can be
achieved using a full domain hash function, in which the
image of the hash function is equal to the domain of
the RSA function. However, most types of RSA widely
used do not implement full-domain hash functions, in-
stead opting for hash functions such as SHA, MD5, and
RIPEMD15–17.
3. Probabilistic Signatures
In 1996, Bellare and Rogaway introduced the notion
of the probabilistic signature scheme (PSS)18, in which
the signature generated is dependent upon the message
and a randomly chosen input. This results in a signa-
ture scheme whose output for a given message does not
remain consistent over multiple implementations. Utilis-
ing a trap-door function (typically one well-used in non-
probabilistic schemes, such as the RSA function), a hash
function and some element of randomness (typically a
pseudo-random bit generator), a signature scheme that
is probabilistic in nature may be implemented. Such
schemes can be used to sign messages of arbitrary length,
and to ensure that the message m is not recoverable from
just the signature of m. RSA-PSS is a common prob-
abilistic interpretation of the RSA signing scheme that
forms part of the PKCS standards published by RSA
laboratories19.
E. Cryptographic Standards and Modern Use
We have already discussed how hashing may be
used before signing a message (along with padding)
to ensure all messages signed are of an appropriate
size. However, the use of hashing in digital signatures
extends beyond the “Hash and sign” idea used for
signing protocols such as RSA. A protocol introduced
by Fiat and Shamir9 has led to the creation of the Fiat-
Shamir paradigm. The Fiat-Shamir paradigm takes an
interactive proof-of-knowledge protocol20 and replaces
interactive steps with some random oracle, typically
a publicly-known collision hash function. A thorough
treatment of the paradigm can be found in Delfs’ and
Knebl’s textbook on cryptography21. In addition to
their use in creating signature schemes that are secure
against adaptively-chosen-message attacks, it has been
shown by Damgard13 that claw-free permutations can
play a role in creating collision-resistant-hash-functions
(this should not seem too surprising, as it is easily
recognised that their definitions are similar: Collision -
resistant hashing can almost be seen as a single-function
analogue of claw-free permutations).
The work of ElGamal on cryptosystems making
use of the one-way nature of the discrete logarithm
forms the basis of the Digital Signature Algorithm22,
a cryptographic standard popular since its proposal as
a NIST submission for the Digital Signature Standard,
DSS.
Recent years have seen an increased interest in
electronic voting, a concept heavily reliant on sig-
nature schemes. Electronic voting typically requires
a cryptosystem that is both probabilistic and holds
homomorphic properties. ElGamal is a good example
of an applicable cryptosystem. Electronic voting has
been used in a variety of countries, including the US(the
2000 Democratic Primary election in Arizona23 is often
cited as a landmark event in internet voting); Scottish
Parliament and local elections since 2007 (although the
2007 elections can be considered good proof as to why
great care must go into researching the implementation
of these systems before use24), Brazil25 (whose 2010
presidential election results were announced just 75
minutes after polls closed thanks to electronic voting),
and India, with the state of Gujarat being the first
Indian state to enable online voting in 201126. In
Europe, Estonia also utilise electronic voting5, with the
idea of the Estonian digital ID-card, which provides a
digital signature, being pivotal in how government and
society are run in the Baltic country.
Another subfield of cryptographic research that has
garnered increased interest in recent times is Elliptic
Curve Cryptography. Schemes based on the discrete
logarithm problem (such as ElGamal/DSA) can be
implemented similarly on the mathematical framework
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of elliptic curves27 instead of finite fields. A key benefit
of deploying a cryptosystem in such a way is the ability
to perform computations at shorter binary lengths than
traditionally used, without conceding security. This
makes such schemes good candidates for when resources
are limited, and Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA)28 is an
example of such a scheme that forms a cryptographic
standard, and is included in the Transport Layer Secu-
rity (TLS) protocol.29
In 1979, Ralph Merkle patented the concept of the
hash tree, commonly known as the Merkle tree after
him. Merkle trees can be paired with one-time signature
schemes (within a symmetric cryptographic framework)
to form a Merkle-Tree Based Signature scheme30. Such
schemes still remain only suitable for one-time use, al-
though the work of Naor and Yung explores an extension
of these types of schemes to complete multi-use signature
schemes. It is believed that such signature schemes may
be resistant to quantum-attacks, which are mentioned
below and discussed further in section 2.
F. Looking forward for security
As we have seen, the vast majority of widely imple-
mented cryptographic algorithms (especially those that
rise from public-key cryptosystems) rely upon unproven
mathematical assumptions about the hardness of certain
problems in order to provide us with security. This re-
view is by no means expansive on the workings of differ-
ent signature schemes under varied cryptosystems, and a
reader seeking a thorough treatise of the field may turn
to Simmons et al.31 (for an exploration of early public
key cryptosystems and signatures) and Delfs-Knebl21 (for
a treatise of modern cryptography, with extensive sec-
tions on signatures). With the increase in research in
applications of quantum theory to modern technology,
these previously held assumptions are left to fall apart in
front of us. Since Deutsch’s introduction of the Universal
Quantum Computer,32 research in utilising the power of
quantum theory for computing has yielded many strong
theoretical results, with early work including the devel-
opment of algorithms for a quantum computer that can
perform certain tasks faster than a classical computer
is believed to be able to. Included in these is Shor’s
algorithm,33 which can perform prime factorisation at a
speed that would allow currently implemented cryptosys-
tems to be broken. Whilst the practical implementation
of such algorithms is yet to yield results strong enough to
cause immediate worry, research is still looking forward
to ensure security shall not be compromised as quantum
computers grow more powerful.
III. POST-QUANTUM DIGITAL SIGNATURES
A. Introduction: A Problem
As previously mentioned, advances in quantum com-
puting have raised concerns for the field of classical cryp-
tography. Here we give a brief overview of why, followed
by a discussion of the responses from the cryptographic
community.
1. Quantum Cryptanalysis of Classical Cryptography
In an era where popular thinking was that problems
based on factoring would be unbreakable, the introduc-
tion of Shor’s algorithm33 in 1994 caused uncertainty
in the security of cryptosystems that were previously
assumed to be secure. This review gives a brief overview
of the techniques used.
Factoring a composite number N can be reduced to
the problem of finding the period of a function. This is
done by picking a random number a < N, checking that
gcd(a,N) = 1 (if gcd(a,N) 6= 1 then we’ve found a factor
of N and we’re done), then looking for the period of the
function:
f (x) = ax mod N. (4)
Up to this stage this can all be achieved classically. The
quantum Fourier transform is used to find the period,
resulting in Shor’s algorithm being extremely efficient
and appearing in the complexity class BQP34. This
is almost exponentially faster than the fastest known
classical factoring algorithm, the general number field
sieve35.
This period solving algorithm can also be used to solve
the discrete logarithm problem36, which also breaks
the hardness assumption of this problem. From this,
Shor’s algorithm can be extended to a more general
problem: the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP)37–39.
The HSP states that given a group G, a finite set X
and a function f : G → X that hides a subgroup H ≤ G,
determine a generating set for H only given evaluations
of f . We say that a function f : G → X hides H if, for
all g1,g2 ∈ G, f (g1) = f (g2) if and only if g1H = g2H.
Within this framework, Shor’s algorithm can be seen
as solving the HSP for finite abelian groups. Other
problems can similarly be generalised to this framework.
For instance, if a quantum algorithm could solve the
HSP for the symmetric group then one of the key hard
problems for Lattice Cryptography (see section III C) -
the shortest vector problem - would be broken40.
Whilst Shor’s algorithm has received the most atten-
tion for the problems it causes in cryptography, it is
by far not the only quantum algorithm to attack cur-
rent schemes. Grover’s search algorithm41,42 can be
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used in certain schemes, and other factorisation algo-
rithms such as the quantum elliptic-curve factorisation
method43 have had some success. We point the reader in
the direction of Bernstein et. al.44 and Jordan et. al.45
for more complete surveys on quantum cryptanalysis of
classical cryptography.
2. What’s being done?
Whilst current estimates place the development
of practical quantum computers capable of posing a
security threat many years in the future (at time of
writing the record for using Shor’s algorithm to factor
a ‘large number’ into two constituent primes stands at
21 = 3 · 7 46, though much larger factorisations have
been achieved in the adiabatic case47), it is pertinent to
replace our current systems well in advance of that. In
light of that, the National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) put out a call for submissions in
201648,49 to attempt to set a new quantum-secure stan-
dard. This ongoing project aims to find new standards
for both public key encryption and digital signatures.
a. Author’s Note Since submitting this paper for
review back in April NIST have announced that they
have moved on to stage three of the standardisation
process. This will be reflected in future drafts.
The NIST evaluation criteria50 for these new schemes
sets out both required security levels and computational
cost. For the security levels, it is assumed that the at-
tacker has access to signatures for no more than 264 cho-
sen messages using a classical oracle. The security lev-
els are grouped into broad categories defined by easy-to-
analyse reference primitives - in this case, the Secure-
Hash-2 (SHA2)15 and the Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES)51. The rationale behind the seemingly vague
categories being that it is hard to predict advances in
quantum computing and quantum algorithms, and so
rather than using precise estimates of the number of ‘bits
of security’, a comparison will suffice. See table I for the
exact security levels.
Level Reference Primitive Security Equivalence
1 AES 128 Exhaustive key search
2 SHA 256 Collision search
3 AES 192 Exhaustive key search
4 SHA 384 Collision search
5 AES 256 Exhaustive key search
Table I: NIST security levels.
For quantum attacks, restrictions on circuit depth are
given, motivated by the difficulty of running extremely
long serial quantum computations. Proposed schemes
are also judged on the size of the public keys and
signatures they produce as well as the computational
efficiency of the key generation.
As of September 28, 2020 the NIST project to set a new
quantum-secure cryptographic standard is in the second
round of submissions, with only nine proposals for digital
signatures remaining. From these, it is clear that there
are two front runners for the mathematical basis which
will replace our current systems: Multivariate and Lat-
tice cryptography. See figure II for how these fall into
the different categories. n
Multivariate Lattice Other
GeMSS52 Dilithium53 Picnic54
LUOV55 FALCON56 SPHINCS+57
MQDSS58 qTESLA59
Rainbow60
Table II: NIST digital signature submissions by
underlying mathematical structure type.
Here we will give a brief overview of both Multivariate
and Lattice based cryptography, followed by a note on
the other schemes.
B. Multivariate Cryptography
Multivariate Cryptography was developed in the late
1980’s with the work of Matsumoto and Imai61. Orig-
inally named C∗ cryptography after the first protocol,
the name Multivariate Cryptography was adopted when
the work of Patarin broke and then generalised the
C∗ protocol62. After Shor’s now infamous algorithm
was developed it was realised that the structure of
Multivariate Cryptography could be used as a direct
response. For a more in depth treatment of the sub-
ject, the reader may consult Bernstein et. al.44 or Wolf63.
All of the schemes are based on a hard problem which is
relatively straightforward to understand (though several
of the constructions extend the basic problem to more
complex settings): the problem of solving multivariate
quadratic equations over a finite field. That is, given a
system of m polynomials in n variables:
P=


y1 = p1(x1, . . . ,xn)
y2 = p2(x1, . . . ,xn)
...
ym = pm(x1, . . . ,xn)
, (5)
and the vector y = (y1, . . . ,ym) ∈ F
m, find a solution x ∈
F which satisfies the equations above. Formally we say
that for a finite field F of size q := |F|, an instance of an
MQ(Fn,Fm)-problem is a system of polynomial equations
of the form:
pi(x1, . . . ,xn) = ∑
1≤ j≤k≤n
γi jkx jxk +
n
∑
j=1
βi jx j +αi, (6)
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where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and γi jk,βi j,αi ∈ F. These are col-
lected in the polynomial vector P := (p1, . . . , pm). Here,
MQ(Fn,Fm) denotes a family of vectorial functions P :
F
n → Fm of degree 2 over F:
MQ(Fn,Fm) = {P= (p1, . . . , pm) | for p of the form (6)}
(7)
Whilst theoretically the polynomials could be of any de-
gree, there is a trade-off between security and efficiency.
Higher degrees naturally have larger parameter spaces,
but too low a degree would be too easy to solve and
therefore would be deemed too insecure. Quadratics are
chosen as a compromise between the two.
The final two pieces required for signatures are two
affine maps, S ∈ Aff−1(Fn) and T ∈ Aff−1(Fm). Both of
these can be represented in the usual way:
S(x) = MSx+ vS (8)
T (x) = MT x+ vT (9)
where MS ∈ F
n×n, MT ∈ F
m×m are invertible matrices and
vS ∈ F
n, vT ∈ F
m are vectors.
For most multivariate signature schemes, the secret key
is the triple (S−1,P′−1,T−1), where S and T are affine
transforms and P′ is a polynomial vector (defined sim-
ilarly to equation (5)), known as the central equation.
The choice of the shape of this equation is largely what
distinguishes the different constructions in multivariate
cryptography. The public key is then the following com-
position:
P= S ◦P′ ◦T. (10)
To forge the signature, one would have to solve the
following problem: for a given P ∈ MQ(Fn,Fm) and
r ∈ Fm find, if any, s ∈ Fn such that P(r) = s. It was
shown in Lewis et. al.64 that the decisional form of this
problem is NP-hard, and it is believed to be intractable
in the average case65.
We now formally outline the general scheme for signa-
tures based on the Multivariate Quadratic problem:
i) Alice generates a key pair (sk,pk), where sk =
(S−1,P′−1,T−1) and pk = P = S ◦P
′ ◦ T , then dis-
tributes pk.
ii) Alice then hashes the message, m, to some c ∈ Fn
using a known hash function, then computes:
s = P−1(c) = T−1(P′−1(S−1(c))),
sending the pair (m,s) to Bob.
iii) Bob then needs to check that P(s) = c = H(m) for
the known hash function H.
See figure 3 for a diagram of how the signature schemes
work. This forms the backbone of most multivariate
schemes. The following subsections examine several of
the adaptations of this framework employed in various
NIST submissions.
Alice
m
Hash Function
T−1
P′−1
S−1 s
Bob
Hash Function
c
P
cˆ
Figure 3: A general schematic for Multivariate
Quadratic signature schemes. Alice hashes the message
m to some vector c ∈ Fn, which is transformed under the
affine transform c′ = T−1(c). The central equation is
then applied, s′ = P′(c′), followed by a second affine
transformation to create the signature s = S−1(s′). To
check the signature Bob only has to recover
cˆ = P(s)[= S(P′(T (s)))] and confirm that it matches the
hash value H(m) = c.
1. Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
The Oil and Vinegar scheme was first introduced by
Patarin66, but was broken by Kipnis and Shamir67 and
generalised to the now common Unbalanced Oil and
Vinegar (UOV) protocol.
Definition 11 (Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar). Let F be a
finite field, o,v ∈ N such that o+ v = n and αi,βi j,γi jk ∈
F for 1 ≤ i ≤ v and 1 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ n. Polynomials of the
following form are central equations in the UOV-shape:
pi(x1, . . . ,xn) :=
v
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
γi jkx jxk +
n
∑
j=1
βi jx j +αi. (12)
The first x1, . . . ,xv terms are known as the vinegar terms
and the second register of o = n− v terms are called the
oil terms. If o 6= v it is called unbalanced.
In these equations, the vinegar terms are com-
bined quadratically with themselves, and then combined
quadratically with the oil terms, whereas the oil terms
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are never mixed with themselves. For a secure construc-
tion, the required discrepancy between the number of oil
and vinegar terms is v ≥ 2o. Unbalanced Oil and Vine-
gar has become one of the most common constructions
for Multivariate Cryptography, and it has itself become a
way of varying other constructions by putting them in an
UOV-shape. Two of the NIST submissions are directly
based on UOV: LUOV and Rainbow. One of the major
problems with UOV is the length of the signatures and
the key sizes, and both of these submissions get around
this by introducing additional structure on top of the
UOV shape. For a comparison of signature and key size
as well as other efficiency markers, see section III F.
2. Hidden Field Equations
The Hidden Field Equations (HFE) protocol62 is a gen-
eralisation of one of the original multivariate systems,
the Matsumoto-Imai scheme61. Similar to Oil and Vine-
gar, the underlying scheme was broken before the under-
lying trapdoor was generalised. However, unlike UOV,
this scheme uses more than one field: the ground field F
and it’s nth-degree field extension E, that is E := F[t]/ f (t)
where f (t) is an irreducible polynomial over F of degree
n.
Definition 13 (Hidden Field Equations (HFE)). Let F
be a finite field with q := |F| elements, E its nth-degree
extension field and φ : E→ Fn the canonical, coordinate-
wise bijection between the extension field and the vector
space. Let P(X) be a univariate polynomial over E with:
P′(X) := ∑
0≤i, j≤d
qi+q j≤d
Ci jX
qi+q j + ∑
0≤k≤d
qk≤d
BkX
qk +A, (14)
where
Ci jX
qi+q j for Ci j ∈ E are quadratic terms,
BkX
k for Bk ∈ E are linear terms, and
A for A ∈ E is constant,
for i, j ∈N and a degree d ∈N. We say that central equa-
tions of the form P′ := φ ◦P′ ◦φ−1 are in HFE shape.
The GeMSS submission to the NIST proceedings uses
Hidden Field Equations, although it adapts the form us-
ing ‘minus and vinegar modifiers’68. This has allowed the
design to become more flexible in its choice of security
parameters whilst improving efficiency.
3. 5-Pass SSH
Unlike the other schemes mentioned, the MQDSS
NIST submission uses the Fiat-Shamir paradigm to
develop a digital signature from a secure identifica-
tion scheme, namely the 5-pass Sakumoto, Shirai and
Hiwatari (SSH) identification scheme69 (5-pass here
refers to 5 passes of information between the prover and
verifier. They also included a 3-pass scheme, but the
MQDSS team found it to be inefficient as a signature
scheme70.) . Here we give a brief overview of the
identification scheme followed by its adaptation to a
signature scheme.
The SSH scheme does not rely on structure built on
top of the MQ problem, which allows them to avoid said
structure from being taking advantage of for cryptanaly-
sis, as in the cases of Patarin71, Thomae72 and Faugere
et. al.73. Instead it is based on an alternative form of
the central equation known as the polar form.
Definition 15 (Polar form). Let P∈MQ(Fn,Fm) and r,s∈
F
n, then the polar form of P is:
T(r,s) := P(r+ s)−P(r)−P(s) (16)
Sakumoto et al. use the polar form to represent the
secret as s := t0+ t1 so that the public part can be written
as r := P(t0)+P(t1)+T(t0, t1). They then further repre-
sent t0 and P(t0) as αt0 = u0 + u1 and αP(t0 = v0 + v1
where α is randomly selected from F. Taking advantage
of the linearity of the polar form r can be represented as:
αr = (v1 +αP(t1)+T(u1, t1))+ (v0 +T(u0, t1), (17)
thus obfuscating the secret. They further hide the secret
by using a commitment scheme prior to the intial pass.
It was proven in Sakumoto et. al.69, that when the
commitment scheme used was statistically hiding the
whole scheme is statistically zero-knowledge.
Using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, the 5 interactive
passes of the identity scheme are replaced by non-
interactive random-oracle access, specifically by a series
of hash functions that replicate the challenges. They go
on to prove the security of this scheme in the random
oracle model in Hu¨lsing et. al.70
4. Attacks
The cryptanalysis of multivariate schemes comes in two
forms:
a. Structural These focus on taking advantage of
the specific structural faults in the design on different
protocols. Included amongst this are attacks on a form of
Multivariate cryptography called MINRANK73 and the
hidden field equations74.
b. General Attacks that directly try and break the
underlying hardness assumption of solving multivariate
equations. These include the use of techniques such as
utilising Gro¨bner bases to make the solving of the mul-
tivariate systems easier. For a good overview of the area
see Billet and Ding75.
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C. Lattice Cryptography
Lattice cryptography was first introduced by the
work of Ajtai76 who suggested that it would be pos-
sible to base the security of cryptographic systems
on the hardness of well-studied lattice problems. The
familiarity of these problems made them an attractive
candidate for PQC. This led to the development of
the first lattice-based public-key encryption scheme -
NTRU77. However, this was shown to be insecure and
it would take the work of Regev to establish the first
scheme whose security was proven under worst-case
hardness assumptions78. For an overview of the field
of lattice cryptography, we direct the reader to Peikert79.
There is a whole suite of lattice problems on which
cryptographic schemes are based. Here - following some
basic definitions - we will introduce the key ideas that
form the foundation of contemporary Lattice Cryptogra-
phy.
Definition 18. A lattice Λ⊂Rn is a discrete additive sub-
group of Rn. That is 0 ∈ Λ, if x,y ∈ Λ then −x,x+y∈ Λ,
and any x ∈ Λ has a neighbourhood of Rn which has no
other lattice points.
We note here that lattices can be more generally de-
fined as a discrete additive subgroup of some general vec-
tor space V , but are most commonly restricted to Rn.
Any non-trivial lattice is countably infinite, however each
lattice can be finitely generated by all the integer com-
binations of some set of vectors in Rn, B = {b1, . . . ,bk}
for some k ≤ n. Typically k = n, in which case we call
Λ a full rank lattice. We call B the basis for a lattice
Λ and express it as a matrix of row vectors. Often we
describe the lattice as a linear sum of integer multiplied
basis vectors, writing:
Λ(B) =
{
k
∑
i=1
zibi
∣∣∣∣∣zi ∈ Z
}
. (19)
A basis B isn’t unique as any two bases B1, B2 for a
lattice Λ are related by a unimodular matrix U such that
B1 = UB2. Another crucial lattice definition is the dual
lattice:
Definition 20. Given a lattice Λ in V where V is endowed
with some inner product 〈·, ·〉, the dual lattice Λ⊥ is de-
fined as Λ⊥ = {v ∈V | 〈Λ,v〉 ⊂ Z}.
Here we give a quick note about additional structure
that can be imbued in lattices. A common technique
is to construct lattices embedding algebraic structures,
such as rings and modules. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to go into detail on how one constructs these, so
we point the readers in the direction of Lubashevksy et.
al.80 and Grover81 for a more complete understanding
of the structure. The justification for these will become
clear once we introduce lattice hard problems.
Another important concept is that of Discrete Lattice
Gaussians:
Definition 21 (Discrete Lattice Gaussian). Given a basis
B for a lattice Λ(B), mean µ ∈Rn and standard deviation
σ > 0, the discrete Gaussian over a lattice is defined as,
DΛ,σ ,µ(x) :=
ρσ ,µ(Bx)
ρσ ,µ(Λ)
, x ∈ Zn, (22)
where ρσ ,µ(y) := exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
‖y− µ‖
)
and ρσ ,µ(Λ) =
∑x∈Zn ρσ ,µ(Bx).
Discrete lattice Gaussian sampling is one of the core
features of Lattice Cryptography, being employed in
some manner in most schemes. However, this form of
sampling comes with a whole host of issues. For one, it is
computationally hard to sample directly from such distri-
butions, leading to algorithms that sample from statisti-
cally close distributions82. Unfortunately, these approxi-
mate distributions aren’t necessarily spherical Gaussians
and therefore have the potential to leak information
about the secret83. Other inherent problems include find-
ing the upper and lower bounds on the choice of variance
- too low a variance also leaks information, but too high
a variance will produce signatures that are insecure (see
later sections). See Prest84 for a more comprehensive
discussion on discrete Gaussian sampling.
1. Fundamental Hard Problems
We now move on to the hard lattice problems. First,
we give a few of the fundamental hard problems, which
form a foundation for the hard problems that contempo-
rary lattice cryptography is built on.
Definition 23 (Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)). Define
λ1(Λ) to be the length shortest non-zero vector in Λ. The
Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) is: given a basis B of a
lattice Λ, compute some v ∈ Λ such that ‖v‖= λ1(Λ).
Here, λm(Λ) are the succesive minima of the lattice,
where each vector ‖vi‖= λi ≤ λ j for i < j, with λ1(Λ) be-
ing the shortest vector in the lattice. The norm function
‖ ·‖ is left intentionally unspecified, though it is typically
the Euclidean norm. This problem is regarded as hard in
both a classical and quantum setting, but it falters when
applied to cryptographic schemes with some probabilis-
tic element. It is more common to use the approximate
analogue to the SVP, which is as follows:
Definition 24 (Approximate Shortest Vector Problem
(SVPγ)). Given a basis B of a lattice Λ(B), find a non-
zero vector v ∈ Λ such that ‖v‖ ≤ γ(n) ·λ1(Λ).
We also make mention of bounded distance decoding
(BDD) which asks the user to find the closest lattice vec-
tor to a prescribed target point t ∈ Λ which is promised
to be ‘rather close’ to the lattice.
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Definition 25 (Bounded Distance Decoding (BDDγ )).
Given a basis B of a full-rank lattice Λ(B) and a tar-
get vector t ∈ Rn with a guarantee that dist(t,Λ) < d =
λ1(Λ)/(2γ(n)), find unique lattice vector v ∈ Λ such that
‖t− v‖< d.
The above problems have varying degrees of prov-
able hardness. The exact version of the shortest vec-
tor problem is known to be NP-hard under randomised
reductions85, however, the implementation of the hard
problems such as bounded distance decoding relies on
polynomial encoding so it is in the complexity class
NP∩ co−NP86. Currently, there are no known quan-
tum algorithms that solve any of the above problems in
polynomial time, but there have been various attempts,
see section III C 5 for further detail.
2. Foundations of Contemporary Lattice Crypto
Whilst the previous hard problems are fundamental
to lattices, they are not easily implementable in lattice
schemes. Here we introduce the two problems which form
the foundation for contemporary lattice cryptography:
the short integer solution (SIS)76 and learning with errors
(LWE)78.
Definition 26 (Short Integer Solution (SISn,qβ ,m)). Given
m uniformally random vectors ai ∈ Z
n
q forming the
columns of a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , find a nonzero integer
vector z ∈ Zm of norm ‖z‖ ≤ β such that:
fA(z) := Az = ∑
i
ai · zi = 0 ∈ Z
n
q. (27)
LWE is an average-case problem introduced by Regev,
often referred to as the ‘encryption enabling’ analogue of
the SIS problem.
Definition 28 (LWE distribution). For a vector z ∈ Znq
called the secret, the LWE distribution Az,χ over Z
n
q×Zq is
sampled by choosing a ∈ Znq uniformly at random, choos-
ing e ←− χ , and outputting (a,b = 〈z,a〉+ e mod q).
The problem comes in two distinct forms: decision and
search. Decision requires distinguishing between LWE
samples and uniformly random ones, whereas search re-
quires finding a secret given LWE samples.
Definition 29 (Decision LWEn,q,χ ,m). Given m indepen-
dent samples (ai,bi) ∈ Z
n
q×Zq where every sample is dis-
tributed according to either:
i) Az,χ for a uniformly random z ∈ Z
n
q (fixed for all
samples),
ii) The uniform distribution,
distinguish which is the case.
Definition 30 (Search LWEn,q,χ ,m). Given m independent
samples (ai,bi) ∈Z
n
q×Zq drawn from Az,χ for a uniformly
random z ∈ Znq, find z.
The learning with errors problem has been shown to be
at least as hard as quantumly solving SVP on arbitrary
n-dimensional lattices. The following security reduction
can be shown following the proof from Regev78:
SVP DGS BDD Search LWE
Decision LWEWorst-Case Decision LWE
Here DGS stands for discrete Gaussian sampling. We
note that the reduction between discrete Gaussian
sampling and the BDD problem is a quantum step.
As previously mentioned, it is possible to construct
lattices from specific algebraic structures such as rings
or modules87, when combined with the above problems
it is known as structured-LWE or structured-SIS. This is
largely done for efficiency reasons as the parameter space
needed to implement systems based on these structures
is greatly reduced80. The choice of which structure is
worth using has some nuances, however. For example,
ring-LWE is generally considered to be more efficient
than module-LWE, however the efficiency comes at a
cost in flexibility and security. Increasing the security
of a scheme requires increasing the dimension of the
lattice, which in the ring case is often chosen such that
N = n where n = 2k for some integer k. Thus, going
up a security level requires going from dimension 512
to 1024 for instance, whereas a more optimal scheme
may lie inbetween these. Module-LWE has dimension
parametrised by an integer d such that N = dn, again
for n of the form 2k. Setting d = 3 and n = 256 allows
for a total dimension of 768, which may be preferable
for the targeted level of security. Even further structure
can be imbued which may yet give greater flexibility:
middle-product-LWE88 and cyclic-LWE89. The security
of all of these schemes based on algebraic structure has
been questioned however, as the reduction to standard
LWE is not fully understood90–92.
All of the lattice based NIST submissions for signa-
ture schemes use some kind of structure: qTESLA and
FALCON are based on rings (FALCON, however, uses
a distinction between binary and ternary forms to cap-
ture the intermediate security levels) whereas Dilithium
is based on module-LWE.
3. The GPV Framework
Introduced in the seminal paper of Gentry et. al.93, the
Gentry-Peikert-Vaikuntanathan (GPV) framework gives
an overarching structure for taking advantage of ‘nat-
ural’ trapdoors in lattices to obtain signatures. It is
built on a signature scheme first introduced in Goldreich-
Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH)94 and NTRUsign95 schemes:
Signing Information in the Quantum Era 14
• The public key is a full rank matrix A ∈ Zn×mq
generating a lattice Λ. The private key is a ma-
trix B ∈ Zm×mq generating Λ
⊥
q , the dual lattice of Λ
mod q.
• Given a message m, a signature is a short value s ∈
Z
m
q such that sA
T =H(m) = c where H : {0,1}∗→Znq
is a known hash function. Given A, verifying s as a
valid signature is straightforward: check s is short
and that sAT = c.
• Computing a signature requires more care however:
i) Compute an arbitrary preimage c0 ∈ Z
m
q such
that c0A
T = c. c0 is not required to be short
so it can be computed with relative ease.
ii) Use B to compute a vector v ∈ Λ⊥q close to c0.
Then s = c0− v is a valid signature:
sAT = c0A
T − vAT = c− 0 = c. (31)
If c0 and v are close enough then s will be
short, fulfilling the second requirement of a
valid signature.
The GGH and NTRUsign schemes, however, proved
insecure as the method for computing vector v ∈ Λ⊥
leaked information about secret basis B and have since
been proven to be insecure by cryptanalysis96–98. The
GPV framework differs in that instead of the determin-
istic algorithm - Babai’s roundoff algorithm - it uses
Klein’s algorithm82, a randomised variant of the nearest
plane algorithm also developed by Babai99. Whereas
both deterministic algorithms would leak information
about the geometry of the lattice, Klein’s avoids this
by sampling from a spherical Gaussian over the shifted
lattice c0 +Λ.
Klein’s algorithm was the first of a family of lattice
algorithms known as trapdoor samplers. The GPV
framework has become a generic framework into which a
choice of trapdoor sampler and lattice structure can be
inserted. It has also been proven to be secure under the
assumptions of SIS under the random oracle model93,100.
A prudent example of an instantiation of the GPV
framework is the NIST submission FALCON101. This
uses a trapdoor sampler known as the Fast-Fourier-
Sampler - developed by Prest and Ducas102 - over NTRU
lattices that take advantage of the ring structure.
4. Bai-Galbraith Signatures
The Bai-Galbraith signature scheme103 is an adapta-
tion of an earlier work by Lyubashevesky104 in which
he develops a lattice-based signature scheme using a
paradigm which he calls ‘Fiat-Shamir-with-aborts’. In-
formally, it follows the chain of reductions:
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Figure 4: A schematic of the GPV signature framework.
Alice hashes the message to a lattice vector c = H(m).
Following this, she creates the key pair
(pk,sk) = (A ∈ Zn×mq ,B ∈ Z
m×m
q ) and sends the public key
to Bob. Using elementary techniques, she computes the
preimage vector (PC) c0A = c, then using the secret key
she samples the vector (VS) v ∈ Λ⊥ such that it is very
close to c0. The signature is s = c0−v. Bob has to check
the signature is small enough and, using the public key,
that sAT [= c0A
T − vAT ] = H(m). Here vAT = 0 since A
generates the lattice and v belongs to the dual lattice.
Hard Problem CRHF One-time signature
ID SchemeSignature
Here CRHF stands for collision resistant hash function.
The main idea is that, from a lattice based CRHF, one
can create a one-time signature following Lyubashevsky
and Micciancio105, however this leaks information about
the secret key. This would not be a problem for a
one-time signature as the information becomes defunct
after the usage. Constructing the ID scheme requires
the repeated use of this, which is where the aborting
technique comes in. In response to the challenge from
the verifier, the prover can decide that sending the usual
response would leak information and instead abort the
Signing Information in the Quantum Era 15
protocol and restart it. The end result is a secure, if
somewhat inefficient, ID scheme. Having to restart the
protocol every time there is information leaked is done
away with when adapting this to a signature scheme us-
ing Fiat-Shamir, however. The lack of interaction means
that the prover can simply rerun the protocol until they
find a signature which does not leak information.
As an LWE instantiation, Lyubashevesky’s scheme has
public key (A,b = Az+ e mod q), where the components
are picked as described above. The verifier picks small-
normed vectors y1, y2 and computes v = Ay1 + y2. With
the message m they compute the hash c := H(v,m) and
the following two vectors: s1 = y1 + zc and s1 = y2 + ec.
The signature is then s = (s1,s2,c). Here, to ensure that
neither s1 or s2 leak information about the protocol,
rejection sampling is employed. Developed across106–108
this technique allows the vectors to be picked from
a distribution independent of the secret. Verification
requires checking that ‖s1‖ and ‖s2‖ are small enough,
and that H(As1 + s2 − bc mod q,m) = c. This can be
thought of as a proof of knowledge of (z,e).
Bai and Galbraith adapted this such that it instead
becomes a proof of knowledge of only z using a variation
of the verification equation and compression techniques.
Once the public key has been created, only one vector is
required, y, from which v = Ay mod q. The least signifi-
cant bits of v are then thrown away and the remainder is
hashed with the message m to get a hash value c. From
this value, the vector c is created and the signature is
(s = y+ zc,c), with rejection sampling again being used
to check that the distribution of z is independent of the
secret. Computing w = As−bc ≡ Ay− ec mod q allows
for verification by checking that the hash value of the
most significant bits of w with m is equal to c. See figure
5 for a schematic for the Bai-Galbraith signature scheme.
Two of the current NIST submissions are based on this
signature scheme: Dilithium and qTESLA. qTESLA
uses the ring-LWE variant whereas Dilithium is based on
module-LWE.
5. Attacks
Similar to the multivariate case, there is a breadth
of literature on specific attacks, both quantum and
classical, and suffice to say we will not be going into
them in too much depth. Here we give a brief summary
of some of the avenues that have been attempted and
references for readers to investigate. Similar to attacks
on Multivariate Cryptographic schemes, these can
largely be broken down into three categories: attacks
on the underlying hard problems, attacks on specific
schemes and side-channel attacks (see section III E for
details of side-channel attacks).
Alice
(A,b)
y
v
Compression
v′
Hashing m
c
s
z
Bob
cˆ
Hashing
w
(A,b)
Figure 5: A schematic for Bai-Galbraith Signatures.
Alice first generates the key pair
(pk,sk) = ((A,b = Az+ e mod q),z), sending the public
key to Bob. After picking a short vector y, she finds the
finds the lattice vector v = Ay and removes the most
significant bits to compute v′ = comp(v). She then
hashes this with the message to create the vector c from
hash value c = H(v′,m). The signature is s = y+ zc. Bob
computes the vector w = As−bc and checks that the
hash value of the most significant bits of w and the
message m is consistent with c.
a. General structure attacks The security of lattice
cryptography can be largely reduced down to the short-
est vector problem, so the general motivation for these
attacks is to solve said problem. Schemes of this kind
tend to come in two forms: algorithmic or sampling.
Largely, the question to be answered is the following:
given a random basis for a lattice, can one find the short-
est vector? Or at least a small enough vector, satisfying
the approximate SVP? On the algorithmic side, there
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are lattice reduction algorithms such as Schnorr109 or
Lyu et. al.110 which attempt to find almost-orthogonal
bases from a highly non orthogonal bases. In a similar
vein, quantum speed ups of vector enumeration have
been proposed by Aono et. al.111 There are also search
approaches such as the sieving algorithms112 and their
quantum counterparts113. Newer approaches, devised
using adiabatic quantum computing, posing SVP as an
energy minimisation problem as in Joseph et. al.114,115
have also been developed. Similar to the use of sam-
pling to generate small signatures, if a truly efficient
discrete Gaussian sampler was developed it could pose a
major problem116,117. Simply setting the centre of the
distribution as the zero vector would allow the shortest
vector to be picked with a high probability. There have
also been suggestions that certain quantum algorithms
could be used to pick vectors more efficiently from these
distributions.
As mentioned previously, the SVP can be shown to
be equivalent to solving the Hidden Subgroup Problem
for symmetric groups, which has also been the focus of
much quantum cryptanalytic research118.
b. Specific attacks For details on how individual
schemes are taking known attacks into account, we re-
fer the reader to the design documents: Dilithium119,
FALCON120, qTESLA121.
D. Symmetric Primitive Based Submissions
Here we give a brief overview of the remaing two NIST
submissions, Picnic and SPHINCS+, both of which are
based on symmetric primitives.
1. Picnic
Unlike the previously mentioned schemes, Picnic only
requires the hardness provided by symmetric primitives
such as hash functions and block ciphers122. It is a
general scheme for the adaptation of a three-move
proof-of-knowledge scheme (known as Σ-protocols) to
signature using a transformation from Unruh123. It is
claimed by Unruh124 that the Fiat-Shamir paradigm for
transforming proof-of-knowledge schemes into signatures
is impractical to prove secure in the quantum random
oracle model and so Unruh provides an alternative. The
Picnic protocol provides two signature schemes: one via
Unruh and another using Fiat-Shamir.
Picnic is built upon a Σ-protocol called ZKB++122,
which itself is built on an earlier scheme called
ZKBOO125. For the sake of brevity, the details of Picnic
and the underlying schemes are omitted and instead we
will explain the underpinning framework by first explic-
itly defining Σ-protocols followed by Unruh’s transforma-
tion.
Definition 32 (Σ-protocol). A three-move proof-of-
knowledge protocol between a prover (Alice) and a veri-
fier (Bob) is known as a Σ-protocol. Alice wants to prove
she knows x such that f (x) = y, where y is commonly
known, for some relation f .
1. Alice commits herself to randomness by picking r,
which she sends to Bob.
2. Bob replies with a random challenge c.
3. Alice responds to the challenge with a newly com-
puted t.
4. Bob accepts that Alice has proven the knowledge if
φ(y,r,c, t) = 1 for some efficiently computable and
agreed upon φ .
Unruh’s transform takes a given Σ-protocol with a chal-
lenge space C, an integer N, message m and a random
permutation G and requires the following:
1. Alice runs the first phase of the Σ-protocol N times
to produce r1, . . . ,rN .
2. For each i∈ {1, . . . ,N}, and for each j ∈C, she com-
putes the responses ti j for ri and challenge j. She
then computes gi j = G(ti j).
3. Using a known hash function, she computes
H
(
x,r1, . . . ,rN ,g11, . . . ,gN|C|
)
to obtain indices
J1, . . . ,JN .
4. The signature she outputs is then s =(
r1, . . . ,rN ,T1J1 , . . . ,TNJN ,g11, . . . ,gN|C|
)
.
Bob then verifies the hash, verifies that the given tiJi
values match the corresponding giJi values, and that the
tiJi values are valid responses with respect to the ri values.
Whilst Picnic is based on the Σ-protocol ZKB++,
there is some choice in the use of the symmetric primi-
tives used in the construction. The choice that has been
implemented in the block cipher family LowMC126, which
is based on a substitution permutation network. Perfor-
mance wise, Picnic is relatively slow and employs large
signature sizes, but makes up for this with provable quan-
tum security.
2. SPHINCS+
SPHINCS+127 is based on an earlier protocol called
SPHINCS128. This protocol is a hash-based, stateless
signature scheme which had the goal of having the
practical elements of other hash-based schemes and
adding extra security by removing the stateful nature.
A stateful algorithm depends in some way on a quantity
called the state, which is initialised in some way. This
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is often a counter, though not necessarily, and stateful
schemes can lead to many insecurities as they need to
keep track of all produced signatures.
SPHINCS expands the idea of using a Merkle tree30 to
extend a one-time signature into a many-time signature
scheme by creating a hypertree. In this tree of trees,
leaves of the initial Merkle tree become the root one-time
signatures for further trees, which themselves cascade
into further trees. The size of the overall tree becomes
a compromise between security and efficiency in the
original scheme: which leaves are picked to become the
next tree are chosen randomly, and so a smaller tree has
a chance to repeat the leaf choice. In order to abate this,
a few-times signature is used at the bottom of the tree.
This randomness is what makes SPHINCS stateless.
Whereas Merkle’s original design iterates over the
signing keys, SPHINCS builds on the theoretical work
of Goldreich129, in which the keys are picked randomly.
The size of the hypertree allows the assumption that the
new key has not been used before.
Improving on the previous design, SPHINCS+ uses a
more secure few-time signature at the bottom of the tree,
known as Forest of Random Subsets (FORS), an improve-
ment on a previous signature called HORST128. A better
selection algorithm for choosing the leaves of the tree is
also included. It also introduces the idea of tweakable
hash functions.
Definition 33 (Tweakable hash functions.). Let α,n ∈
N,P be the public parameters space and T be the tweak
space. A tweakable hash function is an efficient function
T H : P×T ×{0,1}α → {0,1}n, MD ← TH(P,T,m),
(34)
mapping an α-bit message m to an n-bit hash value mes-
sage digest (MD) using a function key called public pa-
rameter P ∈P and a tweak T ∈ T .
This allows the hash functions to be generalised to the
whole hypertree as they can adapt to changes in the cho-
sen leaves of the sub trees. In brief, the SPHINCS+ sig-
nature scheme can be summarised as follows:
1. Alice generates p,q∈ {0,1}n: p is a seed for the root
of the top tree in the hypertree and q is a public
seed. The pair (p,q) form the public key. The
secret key is the pair t,u∈ {0,1}n, respectively seeds
for the few-time signature FORS and the chosen
one-time signature for the protocol, WOTS+127.
2. To sign the message, Alice generates the hyper-
tree and the signature is the following collection:
a FORS signature on a message digest, a WOTS+
signature on the FORS public key, a series of au-
thentication paths and WOTS+ signatures to au-
thenticate the the WOTS+ public key.
3. To verify this, Bob iteratively reconstructs the
public keys and root nodes until the top of the
SPHINCS+ hypertree is reached.
The SPHINCS+ protocol was not designed with the same
kind of performance in mind as either the lattice or mul-
tivariate schemes. Generally, stateless signatures have
much larger key and signature sizes, as well as slower
performances. They mainly target applications which
have low latency requirements but very strong security
requirements, such as offline code signing. In Bernstein
et. al.127 the reader will find an analysis of the security
of this scheme in both a classical and quantum setting
that shows it to be very strong in both regards.
3. Attacks
Here we include references for cryptanalysis efforts
of the above schemes. For Picnic the recent attacks
include a multi-attack on the scheme and it’s underlying
zero-knowledge protocols130, and an attack on the block
cipher used in implementation, LowMC131. Both of
these - as well as some side-channel attack analysis - are
addressed in the design document132.
Currently, main attack against the SPHINCS frame-
work is that of Castelnovi, Martinelli and Prest133,134.
This is a type of side-channel attack known as a differ-
ential fault attack. In the design document135, general
protection against this kind of attack - as well as other
known general attacks - is addressed.
E. Side-Channel Attacks
It would be remiss of this paper to give an overview
of the state of contemporary cryptographic signatures
- especially with regards to new standards - without
a note on side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks
are cryptanalytic attacks that focus on finding flaws in
the implementation of protocols rather than the design.
Examples of this include timing attacks - where an
adversary can gleam information about a secret from a
protocol by taking advantage of a subroutine running
in non-constant time- and energy attacks - a similar
process but instead requires examining the energy use of
the protocols. This has led to some of the bigger breaks
of security systems that have been employed136 (p. 116).
Unfortunately, in the case of Post-Quantum Cryptog-
raphy, it is often a form of attack which has not been
considered in as much depth as is potentially necessary
and many of the submissions are missing a large scale
analysis of how they could be affected. Similar to the
attacks previously mentioned, however, it is beyond the
scope of this paper to go into a great amount of detail so
instead we provide a list of references for invested readers.
For a good overview of side-channel attacks in general,
we refer the readers to Fan et. al.137 or Lo’ai et. al.138
Beyond this, we direct the readers towards specific anal-
ysis of side channel attacks for certain NIST submissions:
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There has been some work on general fault attacks on
Multivariate public key cryptosystems139. Side-channel
attacks on both LUOV and Rainbow can be seen in
the general attacks on Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
schemes140–142.
Dilithium was attacked using a side-channel assisted
existential forgery attack143. This was responded to
with countermeasures suggested in the implementation
that mask the protocol144. FALCON has recently
been attacked using a protocol known as BEARZ145.
The attacking party also suggested countermeasures
to prevent this fault attack and timing attacks on
FALCON. Similarly, qTESLA has had implementation
countermeasures suggested146.
For each submission, we also direct the readers to the
respective design documents52,55,58,60,119–121,132,135. Un-
fortunately the level of detail on each is not to an equal
standard, with some severely lacking side-channel attack
analysis.
F. Performance
When considering the performance of these different
protocols, there are various angles to analyse them. At
a top level view one could compare a range of properties
such as the key size, length of signatures, verification
times and signature creation times. NIST make the point
that these algorithms will be employed in a multitude
of applications, each with different requirements. For
example, if the applications can cache public keys, or
refrain from transmitting them frequently then the size
of the public key is not as important. Similarly, in terms
of the computational efficiency, a server with high traffic
spending a significant portion of its resources verifying
client signatures will be more sensitive to slower key
operations. The call for proposals50 even suggests
that it may be necessary to standardise more than one
algorithm to meet the differing needs.
Whilst the computational efficiency relies on the
specific architecture used, the key and signature sizes
can be compared theoretically. A comparison of the
NIST schemes for these architectures can be found
in table III. Many of the submissions include data on
several variants of their respective schemes but we have
only included a cut down list here. The variants - as well
as the original data - can be found in the submissions
themselves53–60.
The timings, however, do have a certain dependence on
implementation and as such NIST have set out their
requirements with respect to the NIST PQC reference
platform50: an Intel x64 running Windows or Linux and
supporting the GCC compiler. A comparison of the per-
Submission PK Size Signature Size Security level
GeMSS 128 352188 32 1
GeMSS 192 1237964 51 3
GeMSS 256 3040700 72 5
LUOV-8-58-237 12100 311 2
LUOV-8-82-323 34100 421 4
LUOV-8-107-371 75500 494 5
MQDSS-31-48 20 6492 1/2
MQDSS-31-64 28 13680 3/4
Rainbow Ia 148500 32 1
Rainbow IIIc 710600 156 3/4
Rainbow Vc 1683300 204 5
Dilithium 1024×768 1184 2044 1
Dilithium 1280×1024 1472 2701 2
Dilithium 1760×1280 1760 3366 3
FALCON-512 897 657 1
FALCON-768 1441 993 2/3
FALCON-1024 1793 1273 4/5
qTESLA-p-I 14880 2592 1
qTESLA-p-III 38432 5664 3
Picnic-L1-UR 32 53961 1
Picnic-L3-UR 48 121845 3
Picnic-L5-UR 64 209506 5
SPHINCS+-128s 32 8080 1
SPHINCS+-192s 48 17064 3
SPHINCS+-256s 64 29792 5
Table III: Comparison of the key and signature sizes of
the NIST round 2 signature submissions. All sizes given
to the nearest byte.
formance of the timings of the schemes can be found in
table IV. Unless noted otherwise, the submissions used
the reference architecture.
G. Concluding Remarks on Post-Quantum Digital-Signatures
Whilst progress in the field of quantum computing
does pose a threat to our current digital security models
and implementations of digital signature schemes,
throughout this section we have given a brief overview
of the work being done to combat this direct threat.
Working towards NIST’s criteria for both security
and efficiency ensures that sought-after solutions are
implementable with current technology, well ahead of
implementations of Shor’s algorithm being practical.
Where theoretical protocols have struggled to reach a
compromise between security and efficiency, research
has already yielded results to adapt, as shown by
modifications of the UOV-schemes and SPHINCS.
Indeed, this is the case in reality also, with Google
implementing a lattice-based protocol in their Chrome
web-browser (although this has since been removed
in an effort to ‘not influence the standardization
procedure’)147. However, we remain wary of further
threats presented. For example, that a solution to the
HSP problem could cause issues for lattice cryptography
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Submission Key Gen Signing Verification
GeMSS 128 38500 750000 82
GeMSS 192 175000 2320000 239
GeMSS 256 532000 3640000 566
MQDSS 48 1142 36555 26639
MQDSS 64 2671 116772 84685
LUOV-8-58-237 17000 5400 4300
LUOV-8-82-323 71000 15000 1100
LUOV-8-107-371 127000 24000 18000
Rainbow Ia 35000 402 155
Rainbow IIIc 340000 1700 1640
Rainbow Vc 757000 3640 239
Dilithium 1024×768 243 1058 273
Dilithium 1280×1024 371 1562 376
Dilithium 1536×1280 471 1420 511
FALCON 512 6.98* 6081.9† 37175.3‡
FALCON 768 12.69* 3547.9† 20637.7‡
FALCON 1024 19.64* 3072.5† 17697.4‡
qTESLA p-I 2359 2299 814
qTESLA p-III 13151 5212 2102
Picnic-L1-UR 160 172560 116494
Picnic-L3-UR 392 549036 368492
Picnic-L5-UR 753 1234713 828446
SPHINCS+ 128s simple 326805 4868849 5304
SPHINCS+ 192s simple 486773 10259965 7971
SPHINCS+ 256s simple 636421 7570079 10866
Table IV: Comparison of the signature creation and
verification times of the NIST round 2 signature
submissions. Unless stated otherwise these are all to the
nearest thousand processor cycles. *milliseconds, †
signatures/second, ‡ verifications/second.
showcases the need for research to continue remaining
ahead of the curve.
The National Institute for Standards and Technology’s
goal of implementing a new standard is predicted to still
be at least a year off completion so it is far from finalised.
It is certainly likely that the recommendation will be sev-
eral new standards depending on the application. Whilst
there is a notion of simplicity leading to security, some of
the above schemes eschew this in favour of ruthless effi-
ciency (albeit with the necessity for careful implementa-
tion), with some even claiming to be faster than current
protocols. Ultimately the advances in cryptography in
response to quantum computing appear to be leading to
altogether more complicated systems, but for the sake of
security this is certainly the right move.
IV. QUANTUM DIGITAL SIGNATURES
A. Key Concepts General to QDS
The security of classical digital signatures lies in creat-
ing problems that are infeasible to solve. The security of
techniques based on quantum physics instead relies upon
proven scientific principles148. The uncertainty inherent
in quantum physics has in recent years found a great
many uses in the field of security, ranging from random
number generators to optical identity tags149. This well
known phenomena is what protects a system against
attack, as in many cases, it is physically impossible for
the attacker to breach the system without detection.
As with many classical digital signatures, quantum dig-
ital signatures rely upon a one way function for their en-
cryption. In this case however, rather than using a math-
ematical one way function, classical data is encoded as
quantum information150. In order to implement this each
quantum digital signature protocol follows three steps
similar to those in classical cryptography151:
1. GEN: Alice uses her private key to generate a sig-
nature s consisting of quantum information.
2. SIGN: Alice sends her message m to the recipients
(denoted Bob and Charlie) with the corresponding
signature, denoted as (m, pk).
3. VER: Bob and Charlie verify the message is au-
thentic and repudiation has not occurred. In the
general case this involves a comparison of (m,s) to
the classical description of s.
In order to delve further into what each step entails
we will discuss a generic QDS model, although schemes
will vary in their specific implementation of these steps
most follow this general framework151150.
The generation step begins with a purely classical
operation, the random generation of a private key for
each possible single bit message (1 or 0). This key,
denoted as pki = (pki1, pk
i
2, ..., pk
i
L), is purely classical
information, where i = 0,1 to denote the message. Its
length L is determined by the level of security required
and the QDS scheme used. It is using this string
that Alice will identify herself at a later stage so it is
imperative it is never shared.
The next stage of the generation step is done by first
defining a set of non-orthogonal quantum states151. An
example of quantum states that can be used is the BB84
states152. Alice then generates four separate strings
of quantum information (known as quantum digital
signatures) by encoding her pk strings using the defined
quantum states. These four signatures consist of a copy
of the encoded private key for both possible messages
for both Bob and Charlie. These are denoted as qsiB,qs
i
C
with the subscripts denoting who the signature pairs
will be sent to. Alice then sends qsiB,qs
i
C to the correct
recipient via a secure quantum channel. Bob and Charlie
measure their quantum signature pairs to generate a
classical signature from them, siB,s
i
C .
Before proceeding to the next step in most cases Bob
and Charlie randomly select approximately half of the
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elements in their measured signature (though this can
occur before measurement) and forward to the other.
They do not have to exchange the same elements. As
such to all extents and purposes from Alice’s perspective
both siB and s
i
C are exactly the same. This prevents her
from committing repudiation. The exact method of this
“symmetrisation” is dependant on the QDS scheme.
To sign a message in most protocols Alice sends her
message of a bit of 1 or 0 with the corresponding private
key to Bob153, denoted (mi, pki). As the protocols focus
only on the signing of a message it is assumed that the
message is sent along a secure channel whether this be
quantum or classical in nature151. To send a multi-bit
message the process of generation and signing is iterated
for each bit154.
Finally there is the verification stage. This varies
greatly between each protocol (see relevant protocol
section for specific details). The general case is that Bob
compares his measured signature siB to the private key
pki received from Alice. If the number of mismatches
between the two is below the required threshold (see
section IVA1) Bob deems the message as authentic.
If Bob wishes to forward the message to Charlie, he
sends the (mi, pki) he received from Alice. Charlie then
performs the same process with a different required
threshold.
The security of quantum digital signatures is shown
most prominently in the validation step. Each of the
signing protocols relies on the same principles to provide
security. It is key to this that the states chosen are
non-orthogonal. Therefore, any measurement performed
on one state will not commute with a measurement
on the other148. Thus, any measurement performed
will probabilistically disturb the other state, effectively
destroying the information it held155. As such without
knowing the initial private key no one can discern the
original classical input. Getting the correct result is
entirely dependent on chance, even then one would have
no way to tell if it is the correct result.
This is reinforced by the Holevo bound placed on the
information that can be obtained, only a single bits worth
of information may be extracted from a qubit156. This
prevents further information to help the attacker’s de-
ductions from being obtained. If anyone attempted to
forge a signature they would have to guess the private
key correctly based on the information they can gather.
For short private keys this is indeed improbable but still
possible. As a signature gets longer however the chance
of successfully guessing falls off exponentially to a neg-
ligible value for a long enough private key. As such a
simple comparison will reveal their ruse157. Therefore
unlike classical digital signatures QDS is not dependant
on the difficulty of mathematical techniques and as such
demonstrates information theoretic security148.
1. Quantifying Authentication
There are three possible levels to the degree of ver-
ification that Bob and Charlie can deem the mes-
sage/signature combination has fulfilled150:
• 1-ACC: Message is valid, can be transferred.
• 0-ACC: Message is valid, might not be transferable.
• REJ: Message is invalid.
1-ACC and 0-ACC provide similar levels of security
in the standards they uphold, both require that the
message be valid. As such if Bob performs the validation
test on the signature and finds it to be true then the
first condition of these security levels are fulfilled. The
difference arises in the transferability of the signature.
If Bob has any reason to believe that Charlie would not
come to the same conclusion as him then the message
and signature would be deemed 0-ACC (i.e. repudiation
has occurred). Only a message with validation level of
1-ACC is deemed fully secure. Finally if the signature
that Bob receives is invalid then the message is given
the validation level REJ and is rejected.
These criteria are mathematically defined by a series
of thresholds proposed by Gottesman and Chuang150.
We first define the probability of failure of an attacker
p f , this is the probability their measurement will fail to
get the correct classical description given a minimum
error measurement. There is also the probability that
an honest measurement will fail due to environmental
factors such as noise, denoted pe. Both of these thresh-
olds are calculated based on outside factors such as the
number of copies of the signature circulated, the method
with which measurements are taken, the apparatus
used to distribute/measure the signatures, etc. Using
these as the boundaries for acceptable error levels,
with p f as the upper and pe as the lower, the allowed
error thresholds can be set150. For a signature to be
authenticated it must have a fractional error lower than
sv, wherein p f > sv. Based on this the upper bounds of
the probability that the forger can effectively mimic a
valid signature is given by: e−c(p f−sv)
2L151, where c is a
constant. This shows that the security against forging is
dependant not only on the environmental factors (as pe
and p f define the range in which sv can fall) but on the
length of the signature itself151.
One threshold is not enough to protect against
repudiation as stated by Gottesman and Chuang150.
If Alice was dishonest and sent different signatures to
Bob and Charlie (with the aim to have Bob accept and
Charlie reject it), she could successfully repudiate with
only one threshold. With only one threshold (sv) for
verifying the signature Alice could tailor each signature
to have svL errors. The number of errors is defined by a
normal distribution with a mean of svL. As such in the
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probability of Bob accepting the message (errors below
svL) and Charlie rejecting it (errors above svL) is 0.25
151.
By introducing a second threshold sa where sv > sa that
Charlie must pass instead of sv reduces the probability of
successful repudiation to negligible with a long enough
signature. This is due to the fact that Alice would have
to generate a signature that would give a result both
below sv and above sa. In a similar manner to forgery
the upper bound on the probability for successful repudi-
ation is now defined by e−c
′(sa−sv)
2L, where c′ is a constant.
This defines the necessary criteria for setting out
mathematically how to achieve the verification condi-
tions. To summarise the relative size of each of the
thresholds: 0< pe < sa < sv < p f . In order to achieve a
1-ACC level of verification a signature’s error fraction
must be below sv for Bob and sa for Charlie. Falling
below only sv would result in a 0-ACC rating and falling
below neither results in a REJ.
B. QDS with Quantum Memory
The first QDS protocol was proposed by Gottesman
and Chuang in 2001150, hence referred to as GC-QDS.
As the precursor to all other QDS protocols as expected
GC-QDS was only a theoretical proposal, however it is
important to analyse. It sets the standard for the “ideal”
quantum digital signature protocol. One in which the
signature remains as quantum information throughout
the entire process. This ensures information theoretic
security throughout.
As detailed in section IVA, to begin with Alice
generates her random private keys, pki, for each possible
message value. The initial proposal for this scheme
suggested each private key element, pkin, be a two bit
string and qsin the corresponding BB84 state
150. Using
this, Alice generates copies of each quantum digital
signature for each possible message value by encoding
pki as quantum information. As many copies of the
public key as there are recipients are generated and one
distributed to each. The recipients, in this case Bob
and Charlie, then do not measure the received signature
and instead store it in stable quantum memory, a key
difference to other protocols. This is the “generation”
phase for this protocol150.
For the signing phase, Alice only sends out classical
information. She sends to Bob (mi, pki). As with most
QDS protocols this is assumed to be performed over a
secure classical channel. An assumption that can be
inexpensively implemented and so is not outlandish to
assume.
Finally there is the verification phase. Using pk and
the known function for encoding classical information
pk
Alice Bob
(m, pk)
qs Store qs
qsb SWAP test
Figure 6: Flow diagram breaking down the process of
Gottesman and Chuang’s first proposal for a quantum
digital signature protocol. Alice begins by randomly
generating her private key (pk). From this she generates
her quantum signature (qs) which is sent on to Bob.
Bob stores this in quantum memory without measuring
it. To sign a message (m), Alice sends it alongisde its
corresponding pk to Bob. Bob uses pk to genreate his
own copy of the quantum signature qsb. He verifies its
authenticity in a SWAP test with qs. Diamonds
represent information that must be kept private (at
least until sending), circles represent information that is
sent to another individual. In the case of this QDS
scheme the public key is quantum information, all other
information is classical.
as quantum information Bob generates his own set of
quantum states. He then compares the states he has
generated to those he has stored from Alice using a
SWAP test150. If the number of mismatches between the
two falls below the acceptance threshold sa, Bob accepts
the message as authentic. For further verficiation he can
forward (mi, pki) to Charlie who will repeat the process
with his threshold sv.
The unforgeability in this scheme stems from the strict
policy of not measuring the quantum digital signature
until authentication is required151, as demonstrated in
figure 6. For an attacker to forge a signature they would
as in, classical digital signatures, have to bypass the
one-way nature of of the classical to quantum encoding.
Aside from obtaining the private key from Alice the
only way to achieve this is to intercept the quantum
digital signature and correctly guess the measurement
basis for each qubit. Thus, as previously discussed, for
a long enough signature there is a negligible probability
that Bob and Charlie will not notice that the signature
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has been tampered with157. Owing to the collapse of a
quantum wavefunction upon measurement, the very act
of attempting to intercept and forge a message will reveal
an attack has occurred as the signature remains only
as quantum information. The only attack that can be
achieved by interception is to cause the qs distribution
phase to abort150.
The protection against repudiation lies with the
comparative SWAP tests and relevant thresholds that
Bob and Charlie apply to their stored public keys150.
As SWAP tests do not measure a quantum state and
instead compare two to determine similarity it makes
them the perfect operation to enforce non-repudiation.
Coupling the non-destructive nature of the SWAP test
with the thresholds detailed in section IVA renders
the probability of repudiation to negligible with a long
enough signature150.
This scheme is not without faults however, its most
prominent fault is its reliance on the immature tech-
nology of quantum memory. If the technology were
perfected it would allow for the indefinite storage of qs.
As of time of writing however, quantum memory can not
store quantum information for long time periods158159.
In theory this protocol can have long term quantum
digital signatures but in practice this is simply not
possible. Although there have been recent advancements
in the storage times of quantum memories this protocol
is currently infeasible153160.
The SWAP tests themselves are an issue within the
same vein as quantum memory, the technology to per-
form them is not available. Each recipient would require
a quantum computer in order to perform such a test.
As with the quantum memory requirement this ensures
Gottesman and Chuang’s theoretical proposal remains
theory.
C. Multiport set-up
The attractive concept of quantum digital signatures
coupled with the initial proposal’s reliance on quantum
memory and computing lead to a great deal of interest
in QDS from both a theoretical and experimental
standpoint148. The reliance on currently immature
quantum technologies has led to new proposals that find
methods of getting around this constraint. One of the
earliest proposals was that of the multiport161. This
apparatus consists of a square array of four separate
50:50 beam splitters as shown in figure IVC157. The
apparatus and its potential in cryptography was first
proposed in 2006155but only as a theoretical method of
public key distribution. Later, in 2012, it was adapted
for use in quantum digital signatures and experimentally
demonstrated.
For use in quantum digital signatures the multiport is
effectively split in two, the top two beam splitters belong
to Bob and the bottom two to Charlie. The multiport
in of itself primarily affects the generation stage of the
quantum digital signature process.
The generation stage begins the same as other QDS
schemes. Alice generates a randomised classical private
key which she encodes with her chosen quantum basis.
She then sends these to Bob and Charlie. She sends the
the copies of each quantum digital signature at the same
time (i.e. qs1B and qs
1
C are sent out at the same time and
then the other set of copies are sent).
The first set of beam splitters (moving left to right on
figure 8) are used by Bob and Charlie to split their copies
of the signature into two equal amplitude components.
One half of these are kept by Bob/Charlie and the other
half are sent to the other recipient. This ensures that
Alice is unaware as to who has which bit in each of the
copies that she initially sent157159. At the second set of
beam splitters the half that was originally kept by the
receiver is mixed with the half from the other recipient
in a comparison test. The process of this is detailed in
figure 7.
|α〉
|β 〉
|α+β2 〉
|α−β2 〉
Figure 7: Schematic diagram of a single beamsplitter.
From the left enters two separate photon packets, |α〉
and |β 〉. These are combined by the splitter to give
|α+β
2
〉 and |α−β
2
〉.
In the initial implementation of this protocol, Bob and
Charlie would store the received states in quantum
memory ready for the verification stage. In 2014 Dunjko
showed that it was indeed possible to remove the
quantum memory from this protocol157. Progressing
instead to verification via comparison of classical data,
the latter will be the focus of this section.
Rather than storing the quantum digital signature,
the incoming signature is measured and the outputs of
this measurement stored. This classical string of results
then forms an individual’s measured signature. Most
commonly the measurements performed are quantum
state elimination measurements (covered in further
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|α〉
|β 〉
|α−β2 〉
|α−β2 〉
|α+β2 〉
|α+β2 〉
Bob
Charlie
Figure 8: Schematic diagram of the multiport set-up used in the multiport QDS scheme. Each bisected diamond
represents a beamsplitter. The thick black lines at the top and bottom of the diagram represent mirrors. One half of
the array is in the posssesion of Bob and the other in the possession of Charlie.
detail in section IVD), however unambiguous state
discrimination was initially proposed159. The key
principle of either method is that it does not give a
completely accurate description of Alice’s initial private
key. Thus, it does not enable a recipient to then forge
a signature. The measurement and storage of this now
classical signature completes the generation stage of the
protocol.
To sign a message Alice simply sends her single bit
message alongside the relevant private key to Bob159.
Bob then compares the private key to the signature he
measured, applying the sa threshold detailed in section
IVA1 to determine the degree to which he trusts it. He
then forwards the key and message to Charlie to validate
that Alice indeed sent them both the same signature and
similarly Charlie compares the two to see if the errors
between them fall below sv. From these results they de-
termine the level of validity in the message and signature.
The security of this protocol lies with the square array
of beam splitters161. It is the secondary beam splitters
that Bob and Charlie use to check the validity of the
signature. One output of the beam splitters will be a
mixed state of |α〉 and |β 〉. If Alice was honest then
|α〉= |β 〉 and as both are identical and coherent the ini-
tial input from Alice is obtained. If, however, Alice sent
Bob and Charlie different signatures the multiport will
symmetrize these and prevent repudiation161. The null
ports then act as a safeguard against active forging159.
In this scenario Bob is the dishonest party and attempts
to forward a forged signature and message to Charlie.
In this case Charlie would measure a non-zero (assuming
no background count) reading on his null port, informing
him to the presence of a forged signature.
One of the key issues with this scheme is the loss present
in this system, measured at 7.5dB. The signature length
L required for a security level of 0.01% was 5.0×1013 for
a half bit159. The count rate with USE was found to
be 2.0× 105 counts per second. Given that this would
yield a time required of 7.9 years to sign and send this
is clearly an impractical signature length. This is par-
ticularly troublesome when one considers this was not
taken at a separation distance, 5m, great enough for use
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in a practical setting159. Methods of improving upon this
technique were proposed such as increasing the clock rate
of the VCSEL used to generate the pulses. Due to the loss
rates and impractical distance requirements however, us-
ing multiports in quantum digital signatures serves only
as a proof of concept for not requiring advanced quantum
technologies.
D. Random Forwarding
The development of quantum digital signature schemes
shows common themes, the reliance on quantum me-
chanics to achieve information theoretic security and
moving away from the reliance on immature quantum
technologies. Multiports, whilst flawed, demonstrated
that quantum memory and quantum computing is not
necessary for QDS. The next clear step, as stated in the
paper implementing multiports, is to develop a system
that does not use them for security159. The simplest
way to achieve this is random forwarding.
As with all previous schemes, Alice begins by gen-
erating a string of classical bits that she keeps as
her private key. She then encodes this in quantum
states using non-orthognal bases162. Once again two
copies of each quantum digital signature are created
and the copies of the same signature are sent to Bob
and Charlie at the same time (arrows 1 and 2 on figure 9).
Unique to this protocol is that upon receiving the
quantum digital signature Bob and Charlie randomly
choose elements of the signature qsi to forward to the
other, usually by a “coin toss” protocol162153, arrow 3
on figure 9. They then record the location in the string
of those that were passed on and which elements were
retained. If either receive less than L( 1
2
− r) or more
than L( 1
2
+ r), where r is a threshold the two of them set,
they abort162. Thus Bob and Charlie’s final quantum
digital signature will be a randomised mix, who’s
contents is defined only by the “coin toss” performed
to dictate whether to keep an element. From the view
point of Alice therefore once she has sent the messages
the reduced density matrices for Bob’s and Charlie’s
quantum digital signature elements are identical, regard-
less of whether or not she tried to commit repudiation162.
Bob and Charlie then measure their quantum sig-
nature copies to get their measured classical signature
si. This is known as the pre-measurement approach162.
Alternatively Bob and Charlie can measure the quan-
tum digital signature elements before forwarding in a
post-measurement approach. In this case there is no
need for a quantum communication channel between
them, reducing the system to only having the quantum
channels between them and Alice. In either scheme the
technique of USE (Unambiguous State Elimination) is
commonly used to measure qs153.
To sign a message Alice simply sends her private
key concatenated with the message to Bob (arrow 4 on
figure 9). Bob verifies the authenticity of the signature
by comparing how many signature elements he correctly
eliminated. If the error in this falls below sa then the
message is deemed authentic and he passes it along
with the key to Charlie. Charlie performs the same
comparison with his stored classical signature and his
error threshold sv. If it passes this then the message
is deemed valid. Repudiation has not occurred due to
the symmetrised signatures and Bob has not committed
a forgery as Charlie’s signature has successfully been
compared with Alice’s.
Alice
Bob
Charlie
1
4
2
35
Figure 9: Representation of the communication channels
between Alice, Bob and Charlie in QDS schemes based
on random forwarding. Blue arrows represent quantum
communication channels and red classical channels.
Single headed arrows represent one way communication
channels, double headed represent two way channels.
The benefits of random forwarding are apparent in the
reduced dependence on quantum technologies. Stripping
back QDS protocols so one is only using QKD to handle
quantum information is far more practical than quantum
memory or a multiport153163. The technology is more
mature and has undergone a rigorous amount of field
testing. Thus, allowing for easier integration of QDS into
existing networks. In addition using QKD based quan-
tum communication adds, in exactly the same manner for
QKD, protection against message interception. Although
this scheme would result in the sacrifice of some bits for
Alice and Bob to compare it would remove the risk of
outside interception164. Giving the random forwarding
protocol a wide range of applications and versatility. As
such many other schemes build on the primitive of ran-
dom forwarding. Either by developing more advanced
hardware and measurement techniques165 or using it as
the primitive for symmetrisation in schemes such as a
QKD based schemes proposed by Collins et al.163 de-
tailed in section IVE.
Signing Information in the Quantum Era 25
E. QKD Key Generation Protocol
Quantum cryptography as a field did not begin with
the development of QDS, but instead with a far more
developed technique is that known as Quantum Key
Distribution. This is a process by which, through the
exchange of quantum information, Alice and Bob can
generate a secret key for use in encrypted communi-
cation. By observing the error rates that occur in the
measurement of the quantum information it is possible
to detect if an eavesdropper is present148. Through
this it can be confirmed if the exchanged key is indeed
completely secret. If so by using a one time pad protocol
Alice and Bob can achieve completely secure encryption.
This in of itself could be used to generate a digital
signature162164. As Alice and Bob would know that the
signature could only be known by one of them it would
act as an identifier.
This principle in of itself however, is not of particular
use. Firstly it does not allow for more than one recipient,
a major drawback for a signing scheme. Secondly it was
shown that schemes based on partial QKD protocols
could be expanded to multiple recipients and were more
efficient in signing than secret key exchange via QKD164.
The Quantum Key Distribution Key Generation
Protocol (QKD KGP) differs from other quantum digital
signature schemes in how the quantum information is
distributed. It does, however, still follow the usual three
step process of generation, signing and verification.
In the generation step, rather than Alice sending
quantum information to Bob and Charlie, they send it
to Alice163. This is done to simplify security analysis
as it means Alice cannot send out entangled states.
As with Alice in other schemes Bob and Charlie first
generate their own individual random classical private
key for both possible message values (pk0B, pk
1
B and pk
0
C,
pk1C), recording the basis that each element was encoded
in. They encode this as quantum information using the
chosen method (both BB84 states and phase encoding
have been used163164166). Thus, forming two sets of
separate quantum digital signatures qs0B, qs
1
B and qs
0
C, qs
1
C.
Bob (Charlie) then performs a partial QKD protocol
with Alice164. He sends his quantum digital signatures to
her, Alice chooses a random basis, based on the encoding
method used, to measure each element. Resulting in
Alice having two strings of classical elements from Bob
(Charlie), s0B and s
1
B (s
0
C and s
1
C). Bob (Charlie) then
announces which basis each element was encoded in
for each qs over a classical channel to Alice, who then
“sifts” her signatures by discarding any that weren’t
measured in the same basis. Bob (Charlie) discards the
corresponding elements of his private key. Two further
sections of the measured signatures and corresponding
private keys are then sacrificed164166. At first Alice
and Bob (Charlie) determine the hamming distance
between corresponding sections of their signature and
private key. If they are sufficiently correlated (they
need not be exactly the same) the process proceeds and
those sections are discarded. Secondly, Alice and Bob
(Charlie) compare corresponding sections in order to
observe if the error that an eavesdropper who induce
in the measurements is present. If not these sections
are discarded and the process continues. Each test is
performed over a classical channel and if either of these
steps are not successful the process repeats.
Alice will now have 4 sets of signatures, s0B, s
1
B, s
0
C
and s1C. As the error correction usually present in
QKD protocols has not been performed these measured
signatures will not exactly match their private key
counterparts. Bob and Charlie then randomly select
half of their private keys and forward them on to the
other over a secret classical channel. To all extents and
purposes from the perspective of Alice, each of these
keys is identical, as she does not know what has been
forwarded163.
To send a message Alice then sends to Bob (mi,siB,s
i
C).
To verify the authenticity of this, Bob compares siB to his
corresponding private key pkiB and s
i
C to the half that he
received from Charlie. If the fraction of mismatches in
both is less than sa then he deems them authentic. For
further verification he can forward (mi,siB,s
i
C) to Charlie
who will repeat the process with sv as his threshold.
The security of this scheme relies on the already proven
security of QKD whilst adapting that pre-existing tech-
nology for use as a quantum digital signature164. The
key difference to other QDS schemes, that of two differ-
ent quantum signatures for each message, improves the
efficiency of the scheme over both other QDS schemes
and secret key sharing via QKD. Neither Bob nor Char-
lie can be dishonest and attempt to forge as they do not
know the half of the other’s private key that was not sent.
This is opposed to other QDS schemes wherein a forger
has access to the whole of the QDS. The different private
keys removes the risk of colluding forgers whom in other
schemes would have had a copy of the QDS each to try
and determine the correct measurement values from it.
The only option for a forger is to eavesdrop, which can be
determined from the sacrificed bits. As well as this Alice
cannot commit repudiation as she does not know who has
which private key elements. Finally this scheme’s lack of
the need for error correction and privacy amplification
as in a full QKD protocol means it is more tolerant to
noise. As such it can be implemented in QKD based
systems and used in a wider variety of scenarios.
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F. Expanding to Signing Multiple Bits
The protocols detailed in this report have all focused
on signing a single bit of data. The message is encoded
into the quantum digital signature by having a signature
for both possible message values. As of yet there is not
a great calling to analyse multi-bit messages as the focus
is on producing a practical single bit protocol. It is pro-
posed that single bit signing protocols are expanded in
a simple manner to sign a message of many bits167. For
each bit in the message as a whole the signing process
is iterated. Multiple different signature pairs would be
sent to Bob and Charlie. When Alice sends her multi-bit
message she would send each bit with a valid private key
string. Nonetheless some papers have, however, raised
concerns over this. Citing that insufficient research has
been performed in this area154. As such simply iterating
the process may weaken the security of the protocol and
not even be the most efficient way to sign the message.
1. Conflict over Protocol Iteration
The potential issues surrounding iterating a protocol
were first raised by Tian-Yin Wang et al.154 in which
a multi-bit signing scheme was proposed that “tagged”
the ends of a message. This was later returned to and
improved upon168. This work gained attention from
other research groups who also saw an issue in single
bit iteration. Techniques such as ghost imaging167,
quantum but commitment169 and adaptations of Wang’s
initial technique170 have been proposed.
The argument for defining how a protocol handles mes-
sages longer than a single bit in length arises as the whole
multi-bit message itself isn’t encoded anywhere in the
signature. Only the value of a single bit is encoded. In
a classical signature this is the case and allows for the
checking of message integrity. A demonstration of the
the issues of simply iterating a QDS protocol is that of
selective attacks. Defining a message as a series of it-
erated single bits with corresponding private key strings
such that the pair received by Bob (M,PKM) can be bro-
ken down as154:
M = m1||m2||...||mn (35)
PK = pk1||pk2||...||pkn (36)
Where m and pk represent the individual bit compo-
nents of the multi-bit message and their corresponding
private key strings respectively. The corresponding set
of quantum signature strings is therefore denoted by:
QS = qs1||qs2||...||qsn (37)
Where n gives the total bit length of the multi-bit
message and || denotes the concatenating of subsequent
components. Wang154 argued that Bob could success-
fully forge a message by only selectively forwarding
certain bit strings. The practical example used in
Wang’s paper154 was that M sent by Alice consisted of
the bits to represent the phrase “Don’t pay Bob $ 100”.
As this message was produced by iterating a protocol
for each bit, each bit of the message mi would have a
corresponding private key string pki. Bob is now in
possession of a signed message with a set of associated
correct signatures. Wang purported that Bob may
simply only forward the bits (and corresponding private
key strings) that represent for example the message “Pay
Bob $ 100”154168. As the private key string with each
bit will successfully verify when Charlie checks against
his stored quantum signature measurements, Bob has
successfully forged a message from Alice.
This is not the only attack reported by Wang154 that
could be performed. If Bob has in his possession two
separate message and private key sets then, he could
separate out the message bits and “stitch” them together
in a new order to forge a message. For example if he
receives two messages from Alice one stating “Pay Bob
$ 100” and another stating “I have $ 200”, Bob can
choose to only forward the bits in the first part of the
first message with the latter part of the second to give
“Pay Bob $ 200”. As the bit forwarded would have a
correct corresponding private key Charlie would verify
this message as correct.
These would clearly breach the security of a quantum
digital signature protocol. The unbreakable security
that is derived from the quantum mechanical effects
inherent to the system is let down by an issue in how the
protocol is implemented. Despite the minimal further
research to support Wang’s claim the issue raised by it
is still valid. Although the examples mentioned were
simplistic this could have serious repercussions in real
life applications. For example if Alice had sent Bob
a contract then he could choose not to send the bits
relating to sections of the contract he did not approve
of to Charlie. Furthermore these attacks need not even
be performed by Bob, if a malicious third party, Eve,
were to intercept (M,PKM) they could also commit acts
of forgery.
It is clear that work is needed in expanding protocols to
consider how to sign multi-bit messages safely. Although
this work is likely not a priority for many research groups
until the rapid secure signing of a single bit is developed
it is necessary for the full practical implementation of
QDS.
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2. “End Tagging”
A naive solution to this would be to record the
sequence in which the signatures are sent and label
the message/private key combinations with the cor-
responding number170. This would not prevent Bob
from omitting information at the end of a message
however (unless the number of signatures sent exactly
matched the number of message bits) or prevent him
from “stitching” together messages. The latter it would
only make more difficult as he could take the part of one
message (say the first five bits of a ten bit message) and
’stitch’ it together with another (the last five bits of the
second message).
To solve these issues, Wang154 proposed a protocol
to be used as a primitive in an overall multi-bit signing
protocol. Any of the single bit signing schemes detailed
in this report can be used to sign the individual bits, the
“end tagging” process determines how these should be
iterated to form a multi-bit message.
In keeping with the notation for a multi-bit message
given in section IVF1 the first step in the proposed
method is to create a “sufficiently large”168 number
of private key strings. Each of these are labelled as
corresponding to a 0 or 1 message bit (in the same
manner as with single bit signing protocols) and also
sequentially numbered. The method of encoding as
quantum information is independent to the rest of the
protocol, as per single bit QDS protocols a copy of
each signature is generated for each recipient. The
distribution of the set of of quantum signatures S to said
recipients is unaffected by this multi-bit expansion. As
such any QDS generation and distribution scheme can
be used, making this protocol simple to use to extend
existing schemes. The recipients then measure each of
these to create their own set of signature strings.
Where Wang’s proposal tackles the issues of multi-bit
encoding is in the encoding of the message. The following
steps are taken to encode M154:
1. Encode any bit with the value of 0 as 00.
2. Encode any bit with the value of 1 as 01.
3. Add the codeword 11 to the start and the end of
the message.
This results in an output message Mˆ which has 2n = 4
elements compared to M’s n total elements. To sign a
message each bit in the message is assigned a private
key string depending on its bit value and on its location
in the message (e.g. the first bit will be assigned the
first of the private key strings). Alice then sends to Bob
the combination of information denoted as (M,PKMˆ , l)
where the message before encoding is denoted M, the
private key strings for each bit in the encoded message
denoted PKMˆ and l the sequence number of the first key.
Bob then converts M to Mˆ in the same manner that
Alice did. He then applies the authentication method
associated with the method of encoding used to each
measured string si present in the set S. If each string
passes authentication then he knows that the message is
from Alice and that it has not been tampered with. For
secondary verification Bob can forward (M,PKMˆ , l) on to
Charlie for him to authenticate.
The security of the signing of each individual bit is
already well established (see the previous sections in this
report) and so does not need to be discussed further here.
The end tagging and codewords are what enables this
protocol to prevent parts of valid message/signature pairs
from being used to create forged messages as described in
section IVF1. In the first attack described Bob forged a
message by not forwarding the whole message to Charlie
thus, changing the meaning of the message. However, as
each message bit would have a correct associated private
key Charlie would see this as authentic. The end tagging
of each encoded message with the bits 11 prevents this. If
Charlie receives a signature set which does not begin and
end with two signatures representing 1 then he knows it
has been altered. As the bits in the message are encoded
to 00 or 01 there is no place the message/signature can be
“cut” in order to produce the required 11 needed to mark
the beginning and end of a valid message. As the bits are
numbered and labelled as to what bit they represent the
order of them cannot be changed to achieve this either.
G. Further Extensions
Although the quantum digital signature schemes dis-
cussed so far are in theory completely secure, many of
them have limitations. For example, assumptions made
in theoretical models or even laboratory experiments that
are required to simplify the problem are detrimental in
practical implementations. Assumptions made regard-
ing channel security allow for focus on just malicious ac-
tions by just Alice, Bob or Charlie. In reality it will not
be the case that only one of those three are attackers.
Other considerations include the practical implementa-
tion of such schemes and what side channel attacks can
be performed on them. These simplifications are neces-
sary in order to create the theoretical models required
but in order for quantum digital signatures to become a
viable technology they must be built upon.
1. Insecure Channels
With the exception of the QKD based scheme (see
section IVE) each of the schemes so far have made the
assumption that quantum information is sent over an
authenticated quantum channel171. Namely that the
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information sent is always the same as the information
received. This simplifies analysis as it ensures that there
is no “Eve” (forger intercepting the information). Whilst
the same protections against Bob(Charlie) forging would
still apply to Eve, there is no way for the recipients
to detect that an interception has occurred until the
verification step, at which point the individual who
received the legitimate signature would disagree with
the one that didn’t.
Whilst there are (costly) methods of implementing an
authenticated quantum channel151 this need not always
be necessary. First of all we can take a leaf from the
book of QKD. As discussed in section IVE Alice and
Bob(Charlie) can sacrifice a section of the received QDS
to ensure they are sufficiently correlated. If the expected
level of error (based on the authentication threshold) is
present in this then they can be sure no eavesdropping
has occurred. If it is greater than this however, they
know Eve is present and can restart the process with a
different channel164.
The QKD based scheme gives us other methods that
can be used in order to bypass the issue of insecure
channels for any scheme. In particular that of two
separate quantum digital signatures being sent from
Bob and Charlie to Alice163. Assuming Eve does not
intercept both the quantum channels then she does not
have access to the whole quantum digital signature.
This does not allow for the detection of Eve before the
verification step but ensures that so long as she does not
have access to at least one quantum channel she cannot
commit a forgery.
Finally, as proposed with the initial concept for the
QKD based QDS scheme is the principle of sending de-
coy states171. A scheme that includes decoy states pro-
ceeds with the generation of the two copies of a potential
message’s quantum signature but before the messages are
dispatched they pass through a separate amplitude mod-
ulator. This randomly and independently changes the
intensity of the signature element pulse to one of three
possible values, µ , ν, or 0. Each with their own defined
probability distributions. Only the state in which Bob
and Charlie both receive µ intensity states is deemed the
signal state, the other 6 possible combinations are decoy
states. Alice then announces the intensity of each pulse
allowing Bob and Charlie to discard any states that were
decoys.
2. Measurement Device Independent
As is the case with many concepts in cryptography, a
scheme itself may be secure but in its implementation
weaknesses may be found and exploited. These are
known as side channel attacks. In classical cryptography
and example of this would be analysing the power
output of a CPU during encryption in order determine
further information about the process used. As such in
theoretical models and laboratory tests these are often
not considered. Side channel attacks are in fact common
in the field of quantum cryptography151148. As there is
no way to breach the encoding of the information itself,
an attacker must look for exploits elsewhere.
Measurement Device Independent (MDI) schemes by-
pass these issues by having all quantum communications
occur via an untrusted central relay, “Eve”172, as shown
in figure 10. As such none of the other members of the
communication actually perform any measurements.
They no longer need to be concerned with detector
based side channel attacks such as detector blinding as
the relay is treated as a “black box”.
Alice
Bob
Charlie
Eve
Figure 10: Representation of the communication
channels between Alice, Bob, Charlie and the central
relay Eve in MDI QDS schemes. Blue arrows represent
quantum communication channels and red represent
classical channels. Single headed arrows represent one
way communication channels, double headed represent
two way channels.
To do this Alice performs the QKD KGP for QDS
technique described in section IVE with Eve. For each
state sent, Alice applies random intensity modulation
to create a series of decoy states and one signal state
(as described in section IVG1). This is known as
a Measurement Device Independent Key Generation
Protocol (MDI KGP) and is based off of MDI QKD
protocols166160.
Eve announces the results of each measurement and
their intensity over a public channel. Alice and
Bob(Charlie) then communicate over an authenticated
classical channel which intensity state was the signal state
as well as which basis was used172. Thus generating a
signature without direct quantum communication. Bob
and Charlie symmetrise their signature strings and the
scheme proceeds to the messaging and verification stages.
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Author Scheme Summary Distance
(km)
Signature
Length
Time to
sign (s)
Clock rate
(Hz)
Security
level
Collins et al.159 Multiport with
USE
0.005 5.1∗1013 100∗106 10−2
Collins et al.163 DPS QKD 90 2502 109 10−4
Donaldson et al.153 USE based post-
measurement
random
forwarding
0.5 1.93∗109 20 10−2
Croal et al.165 Hetrodyne
Measurements
1.6 7∗104 2.2∗106 10−2
Yin et al.173 Decoy State 102 2.5∗1012 33420 10−5
Roberts et al.160 MDI-QKD 25 103336 36
Yin et al.166 MDI-QDS (MDI-
KGP)
787468 10−7
Yao et al.167 Temporal Ghost
Imaging
93.9 (signs
10 message
bits at a
time)
4 10−4
Table V: Summary of the figures of merit of signature schemes referenced in this review. Only includes experimental
results and not theoretical estimations of proposed schemes. “Distance” refers to the distance between Alice and Bob
or Charlie. “Signature Length” to the bit length of the signature required to sign a single bit message.
3. Expanding to Multiple Parties
Each scheme that has been discussed has focused on
at maximum three parties communicating. A sender
of the message (Alice) and two recipients (Bob and
Charlie). In a practical communications scenario this
obviously will not be practical160. In the case of sending
a mass message authenticated with a quantum digital
signature there will be more than two recipients for the
same signature.
However, this raises two concerns. The first is a
practical one; in the schemes described above for a
practical quantum communication network, each pair of
users will require a quantum communication channel.
Scaling as N(N − 1)/2 links for N users160. As N
increases this number becomes less and less practical to
implement. A solution to this issue could be the network
architecture discussed in section IVG2. Rather than
each pair of members of the communication network
having a quantum communication channel between each
other they instead each have one quantum channel with
an untrusted central relay. This reduces the scaling of
the number of required channels to N−1 for an N mode
network.
The second issue is a security concern. If Alice
sends out the same quantum digital signature to each
recipient then, if there are more than two recipients,
for N recipients up to a maximum of N− 1 of them can
collude to attempt to commit forgery against the others.
Due to the uncertain nature of the measurements of
the quantum signature no single recipient will have a
fully correct signature. However, by working together
multiple malicious parties can work together to improve
their chances of a successful forgery. This issue was first
addressed in ref174 where a generic case of a multiparty
scheme was first proposed. Ref175 further expanded
upon this concept.
Using the decoy state KGP scheme as a basis (see sec-
tion IVG1) they expand this from only having two re-
cipients to a general case of N recipients174. To achieve
this each recipient generates their own private key for
each possible message. They generate a quantum signa-
ture for each and distribute to Alice using the process
detailed in section IVG1. Each recipient then randomly
chooses half of the bits in their private key and forwards
it to each other recipient. Resulting in the final private
key for each being (N − 1)L/2. As such from the view-
point of Alice each private key is exactly the same. Each
recipient as well will never know all of the private keys as
each other recipient kept half of theirs. Therefore even if
N−1 recipients colluded they could not successfully forge
a signature from Alice. The proposal also discusses the
implementation of a system of security levels to quan-
tify how often a signature can be forwarded and remain
safe (as this will affect the authentication threshold)174.
On top of this is a majority voting protocol for resolving
disputes. Thus, fully outlining the protocols required to
generalise a QDS protocol to any number of recipients.
H. Concluding Remarks on QDS
The field of quantum digital signatures is a relatively
new area of research but in the time it has existed it has
developed from a purely theoretical concept into (albeit
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limited) practical implementation over 100km of fibre173.
Arguably the most important advance that allowed for
feats such as this is that of random forwarding. Whilst
simplistic in design this has allowed for the reduction
of the quantum technology required in QDS down to
simply that used in the already well tested QKD. This
paved the way for future schemes which improved upon
the basic random forwarding scheme detailed in section
IVD. This was achieved either with better hardware
or by using it as a primitive for new concepts such as
the QKD KGP scheme, which at the moment boasts
one of the quickest signing rates over the longest distance.
Quantum digital signatures however, are by no means
ready for full commercial use. No current scheme fully
solves all of the issues that would allow for QDS to move
into broader practical use. For a scheme to be viable for
use it must not rely on the assumptions stated in many
papers to work. It must be able to work with insecure
channels, be immune to side channel attacks and allow
for both multiple bits and multiple users securely. The
MDI KGP scheme detailed in section IVG3 (with the re-
cipients sending the signatures to Alice) currently comes
the closest to achieving this. It is secure against forging
and repudiation and if adapted to include the multi-bit
signing techniques detailed in section IVF would allow
for many bit messages to be sent to many recipients. No
one has yet, however, attempted to practically implement
such a scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
Signatures play a vital role in the security and trustwor-
thiness of communications and, moving forwards, there
are valid concerns about the long-term reliability of the
digital signature schemes that have been widely adopted.
Solutions basing their security on quantum mechanics,
rather than complex mathematics are appealing but are
far from commercial readiness, and post-quantum digital
signatures form an optimal middle ground whilst quan-
tum technologies mature.
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